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ABSTRACT 
GRASSROOTS AND COMMUNITY ACTIVISM WITHIN MILWAUKEE’S 
BLACK COMMUNITY: A RESPONSE TO CENTRAL CITY 
RENEWAL AND REVITALIZATION EFFORTS IN THE  
WALNUT STREET AREA, 1960s TO 1980s 
 
by 
 
Madeline Riordan 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Arijit Sen 
 
 Many researchers and scholars have explored the Black urban experience and have often 
chosen to focus on the systemic and institutionalized forms of racism that affect different aspects 
of Black lives. Descriptions of central city lives as told by Black central city residents are starkly 
similar to the descriptions of Black residents of industrialized cities throughout the United States. 
Fragments of the Black urban experience are contained in discussions of the effects of urban 
renewal efforts, including “redevelopment” and “revitalization,” beginning most heavily in the 
1940s. Looking back at urban renewal designs and strategies from the 1940s through the 1980s is 
crucial to beginning to understand the entirety of the Black urban experience. Much of the 
literature on urban renewal focuses on the ramifications of legislative programs and the factors 
that influenced decision making at multiple levels, primarily the individual, the community, the 
larger city, and within public and private spheres. These pieces, however, do not tell the entire 
story, and tend to leave out the influence that grassroots and community groups within central 
city Black neighborhoods had over the revitalization of their immediate environments. While 
some scholarship does engage with Black agency, it, again, tends to focus on what is happening 
to local Black populations, not on what is being done by Black community members. This thesis 
  
iii 
focuses on a particular Black community and how their actions created change and, thus, 
contributes to the evolving discussion of the Black urban experience.  
It is important to investigate Black grassroots and community groups in order to come to 
a fuller understanding of a crucial piece of the Black urban experience and to challenge a still 
predominant viewpoint that the Black urban population was largely idle in terms of taking action 
to influence their surroundings. In addition to exploring this marginalized history, this thesis 
seeks to add to the narrative of Milwaukee’s Black population, whose voice has repeatedly and 
intentionally been overpowered, and to expose a small portion of the structural and institutional 
racism and disadvantage those in power have historically exposed this country’s Black 
population to.  
 In order to accomplish these objectives, this thesis will examine the creation of 
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, the subsequent destruction of this community that accompanied urban 
renewal efforts, and the response of Black residents to this destruction. This thesis will focus on 
the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc., whose primary goal was to save the integrity of a 
particular Black neighborhood through the preservation of housing and the integration of 
residents into decision-making roles. To fully understand how Milwaukee fits into the narrative 
of urban renewal experiences in the United States, preeminent scholars such as Gilbert Osofsky, 
James R. Grossman, Arnold R. Hirsch, Thomas J. Sugrue, David M.P. Freund, Katherine 
McKittrick, and Mindy Thompson Fullilove will be referenced as they have laid the groundwork 
for how certain decisions came to be racialized to harm Black central city residents and the 
effects that urban renewal efforts had on existing Black communities. In addition, scholars that 
have studied the City of Milwaukee, such as John Gurda, Joe William Trotter, Jr., Patrick Jones, 
and Paul Geib, will be utilized to piece together pieces of the Black urban experience that, to an 
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extent, have already been explored. Archival materials from governmental entities and the 
Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc. will be utilized to showcase first-hand accounts of 
events and to emphasize the narratives of this particular Black community. 
 These existing documents and pieces of scholarship help to uncover one community’s 
response to central city revitalization efforts in the post-industrial city of Milwaukee. They are 
pieced together to expose a contradiction to the predominant view of the Black population while 
emphasizing how outside factors work together to negatively influence environments and 
populations deemed unfit or undesirable. Instead of perpetuating the acceptance of erasing 
certain components of the Black urban experience, this research project seeks to give space to 
discuss the activism among Black residents that took place in one urban setting while advocating 
for the inclusion of Black histories into the history of Milwaukee. It is the hope of this author 
that this research project will encourage future scholars to engage with the Black urban 
experience in a way that emphasizes the activism of the Black community and exposes racism 
within structural and institutional entities that subdue and omit the Black voice.
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Chapter One 
The Black Urban Experience: Reconnecting Black Histories to City Histories 
 
 Black voices have traditionally been left out of discussions regarding Black1 experiences, 
especially during instances of cultural upheaval. One such instance of this historical disregard is 
that of the Black urban experience during the years comprising national and local urban renewal 
projects. Although formalized federal urban renewal legislation ceased to gain much backing 
after the 1970s, scholars are still attempting to understand the ramifications of urban renewal 
projects that began in the 1940s. Research on this subject continues to be relevant because ideas 
about the Black urban experience are changing, new urban renewal efforts continue to affect 
residents, and there is much to learn from the histories that come out of cities affected by urban 
renewal.  
This particular thesis research project engages with a small neighborhood in the City of 
Milwaukee surrounding a once thriving thoroughfare, Walnut Street, and the actions that 
residents took to deal with the consequences of urban renewal. Although this case study is only a 
small example of the many urban renewal projects that took place from the 1940s through the 
1980s, it begins to bring to light the activism of Black residents in influencing their immediate 
environment. However, to fully comprehend urban renewal as a movement, it is important to 
explore the context of urban renewal in a broader, national sense.  
To inform my preliminary background research, I explored concepts brought to light by 
Gilbert Osofsky, focusing on Harlem, James R. Grossman and Arnold R. Hirsch, focusing on 
                                                           
1 This author has chosen to capitalize the term “Black” throughout this document. The Chicago Manual of Style 16th 
Edition, Chapter 8, Rule 8.39 states “common designations of ethnic groups… are usually lowercased unless a 
particular publisher or author prefers otherwise.” This particular author prefers the capitalization of the term “Black” 
as it refers to a cultural and political formation of people, not a skin color. “White,” on the other hand, is not 
capitalized due to negative ties with white supremacy groups, such as the Klu Klux Klan.  
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Chicago, and Thomas J. Sugrue and David M.P. Freund, focusing on Detroit. Not only are there 
demographic similarities between cities like Milwaukee, Harlem, Chicago, and Detroit, but there 
are also similarities in larger matters, particularly when discussing housing discrimination. It is 
through the examination of these particular scholars that these matters become increasingly 
apparent. Osofsky, Grossman, Hirsch, Sugrue, and Freund focus primarily on the economic and 
political landscapes that shaped the Black urban experience in these cities. In order to fully 
understand the ramifications of these landscapes, one must delve into the reasoning behind 
certain decisions and the effects that they have on those impacted by them, in this case, Black 
Americans.2 
Exploring these larger issues reveal loftier themes that arise out of urban renewal 
projects, such as the deliberate “killing” of certain sections of the city, designated as urbicide by 
Katherine McKittrick, and the emotional impacts of demolition and displacement, designated as 
root shock by Mindy Thompson Fullilove. McKittrick and Fullilove utilize the discussions that 
Osofsky, Grossman, Hirsch, Sugrue, and Freund engage with, but take the conversation a step 
further by exploring how legislation and decision making have historically been conducted and 
how residents, especially Black residents, were directly affected, both physically and mentally.  
Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto and Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the 
Great Migration by Gilbert Osofsky and James R. Grossman respectively, discuss the migration 
of Black people from the South to the North for employment opportunities and due to their desire 
to escape racial and social rejection and violence. Gilbert Osofsky focuses on the community of 
                                                           
2
 Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto, (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), James R. Grossman, Land 
of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 
Arnold R. Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940 – 1960, (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), Thomas J. Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar 
Detroit, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), & David M.P. Freund, Colored Property: State Policy & 
White Racial Politics in Suburban America, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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Harlem in New York City for his examination of the housing situation that Black people faced 
when they chose to settle in this location. In the late 1800s, Harlem became Manhattan’s first 
suburb, transforming from a shantytown to a modern urban center filled with transportation, 
lighting, and contemporary sanitation facilities. Land was cheap and residents and contractors 
had high hopes for the area. In areas of Harlem that did not become part of this initial wave of 
development, Europeans and Black Southerners settled.3 
While Black individuals and families traditionally lived in the less attractive 
neighborhoods on the outskirts of residential areas, affluent Black people pushed for integration 
into the more prosperous areas. With the continued influx of Black people from the South, 
housing space was in high demand. Because of the predominant social perception of migrating 
Black people, many white residents, including those European immigrants that generally lived in 
the same areas as Black individuals and families, did not want to live in close proximity to this 
incoming Black population. Consequently, a massive exodus of people occurred, opening up 
residential space for Black people to settle.4  
Osofsky finds that due to the high rents landlords charged Black tenants, Harlem was 
transformed, once again, from an area of prosperity to an area containing slum-like conditions. 
The “slum-like” conditions Osofsky references include, but are not limited to, the overcrowding 
of housing due to the accommodation of lodgers, inability to keep up with sanitation, lack of 
attention towards physical housing needs, and higher rates of death from diseases. These 
conditions forced the decline of Harlem and thrust Black residents into unstable and unhealthy 
living conditions, stifling their ability to become independent. To combat some of these 
                                                           
3 Osofsky, Harlem, 75. 
4 Ibid., 9 & 109.  
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conditions, Osofsky discusses the creation of social service agencies in Harlem, and the entire 
state of New York, to aid Black residents in their escape from the cycle of instability.5  
While Osofsky recognizes the negative impacts that certain conditions, such as those 
present in Harlem, had on Black bodies, what he fails to emphasize and discuss in depth are the 
implications of race relations on Black people as both individuals and as entire communities. 
Osofsky continues to perpetuate the dominant view of white scholars: Black people had control 
over their immediate environments and slums were created because of Black resident’s lack of 
desire, not because of systemic racialized practices. In addition, his discussion of the creation of 
social service agencies to aid Black people in escaping the “cycle of instability” perpetuates the 
conversation regarding the incapability of Black people to help themselves. It also emphasizes 
the need for larger societal interventions when, in fact, the environments of Black residents were 
created by those in power, mainly white individuals.  
James R. Grossman focuses on the main reasons behind the migration of Black 
Southerners to Chicago - increased independence and to escape racial oppression they continued 
to experience - through the eyes of the migrants themselves. To Black Southerners, Chicago 
represented stable employment, higher compensation, freedom from racial criticisms, and good 
schools for children.6 Journeys to the North were often fraught with legal and social 
ramifications for Black people attempting to leave the South. Many Southern Black residents 
were fearful of white violence, social ridicule, and the unknown of leaving their Southern roots. 
These reservations caused many Black people to stay in the South, appeasing the whites that 
sought to keep them there.7 In an attempt to put the claims of Southern whites to rest, many 
Black migrants reached out to Chicago social service agencies, churches, and employers for 
                                                           
5 Ibid., 135-136.  
6 Grossman, Land of Hope, 16-17.  
7 Ibid., 22-23 & 99. 
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financial resources and the guarantee of employment opportunities upon arrival. Although there 
were organizations in Chicago designed to help migrants find employment and housing, racism 
still existed within these sectors.8 
While Osofsky chose to focus on Harlem’s housing, Grossman looks at the racial 
tensions that Black people experienced in Chicago’s employment sector, particularly when Black 
workers were used as strikebreakers, or temporary employees, and when Black workers refused 
to join unions. Each of these situations created and exacerbated tensions between white and 
Black workers portraying Black employees as “usurpers” of white jobs during strike times and 
outsiders when refusing to join unions. In addition to the negative perceptions that Black workers 
faced in Chicago, they encountered ongoing job and financial insecurity, which, in turn, 
prompted the creation of social service programs, as discussed in Osofsky’s work.9 
By using the viewpoint of the Black migrant in this work, Grossman is able to integrate a 
discussion of personal perceptions of the process of migration into a conversation about the 
hardships faced upon arrival in Chicago. Grossman is also able to discuss the incorporation of 
grassroots organizing through structured aid given to new Black migrants in order to combat 
some of the negative racial ideologies faced in Chicago. He also suggests that, while there were 
hurdles to jump over, Black migrants played a more active role in their decisions to leave the 
South, which relied heavily on the transference of information from the North to the South. 
Grossman’s discussion begins to make the move from Black residents in the North being 
depicted as passive actors in a larger urban evolutionary story to active participants in collective 
social and economic decisions that affected the Black community in the years that followed the 
Great Migration. 
                                                           
8 Ibid., 116. 
9 Ibid., 170-174, 210 & 221.  
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Both Osofsky and Grossman look at the Black urban experience through the lens of the 
Great Migration and the years surrounding that particular movement of bodies. Other scholars 
focus on the Black urban experience in post-industrial cities in the years that followed the Great 
Depression and the end of World War II (WWII). Arnold R. Hirsch does so in his work Making 
the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940 – 1960 as does Thomas J. Sugrue in his 
work The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit. 
Many scholars assume that racial ideologies manifested through the ghetto were fixed 
and unchanging. Arnold R. Hirsch, however, through his exploration of Chicago, concluded that 
ideas and perceptions of the ghetto and its inhabitants are constantly being “renewed, reinforced, 
and reshaped.”10 He argues that ideologies and perceptions of the ghetto and its Black inhabitants 
are formed by white citizens and expressed through legislative and municipal regulation, 
yielding a racially segregated city. Instead of focusing on actions that Black residents took to 
create their communities, Hirsch focuses on the white population of Chicago and argues that it 
was this particular population that enabled the creation of Chicago’s “second ghetto” by 
maintaining and perpetuating racial segregation.11  
White residents largely opposed urban renewal plans that included the construction of 
low-income housing in white neighborhoods because they saw incoming Black residents as a 
threat. Consequently, plans were stalled and displaced Black residents were relocated to already 
existing Black communities where living conditions were no better than the communities they 
left.12 Some areas predominately occupied by Black residents were “reclaimed” by whites for 
                                                           
10 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto, xii.  
11 Ibid., 23-39. 
12 Ibid., 136-137.  
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middle-class residential neighborhoods. These actions effectively reinforced residential 
segregation and white self-interest.13  
While much of Hirsch’s argument is novel and adds to the discussion of the effects of 
white people exerting power over the Black population in a crucial way, he focuses so 
extensively on the power of white people over Black residents that personal accounts of Black 
resistance get lost. Hirsch’s exploration only allows for a piece of Chicago’s physical and 
demographic structure to be explored, thus, giving white people in power additional influence by 
erasing particular chunks of this time period. 
 Thomas J. Sugrue focuses his research on post-WWII Detroit and suggests that 
accumulating circumstances, such as white flight and deindustrialization, were the causes of 
negative racial tensions in central cities. This viewpoint strays from popular discussion of the 
time that conversely sees these as outcomes of racial tensions. As many scholars suggest, Black 
individuals and families disproportionately suffered the negative consequences of economic 
decline following the end of both World War I (WWI) and WWII. In terms of housing in Detroit, 
Black residents suffered at the hands of whites through the use of violence, intimidation, and 
legislation that continued to force them into dilapidated, crowded, and unsafe neighborhoods.14 
Sugrue discusses some tactics used by Black residents to ensure the manageable 
expansion of their neighborhoods and communities, but recognizes that many white homeowners 
saw these tactics as threats to their own stability. Accordingly, racially discriminatory practices, 
such as redlining and the creation of semi-political activist groups like Neighborhood 
Improvement Associations, were utilized to keep Black persons out of white neighborhoods. 
                                                           
13 Ibid., 157-160. 
14 Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis, 4-8. 
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Sugrue finds that urban decline was ultimately a perfect storm resulting from economic and 
political decisions made on multiple levels, including institutions, groups, and individuals.15 
Sugrue points to the fact that the urban crises of the 1960s, such as deindustrialization 
and white flight, were evident in central cities during preceding decades. He highlights Black-led 
organizations that fought against the seemingly resolute situations into which Black residents 
were thrust and environments in which they were contained. Sugrue also finds a way to integrate 
many aspects of the Black urban experience into this work while taking the Black perspective 
into account, which had been largely missing from prior scholarly pieces. 
Using Sugrue as a jumping off point, David M.P. Freund continues the exploration of 
race relations in terms of economics and politics, focusing on housing in Detroit. He centers on 
two main ideas throughout this book: the definition of race is constantly evolving and the ways 
in which racism is manifested are also continuously changing. Whites in the 1960s were 
preoccupied with homeownership, property, and neighborhoods, which affected the ways in 
which they viewed Black people. Freund suggests that racism of the 1960s was not based on 
physical differences, but rather the notion that Black people “posed a threat to communities of 
white property owners.”16 Freund states that this particular manifestation of racism was fueled by 
governmental decisions that created residential segregation, in the form of suburbs, and 
perpetuated the perception that inequality was merely a manifestation of market forces.17 
As in Hirsch and Sugrue’s books, Freund points to tactics that were used and 
implemented by governmental entities to ensure that residential and racial segregation were 
preserved while absolving themselves of any racist burdens associated with these practices. Not 
only was the government absolved of the accusation of being racist, but white homeowners could 
                                                           
15 Ibid., 11, 38 & 214-215. 
16 Freund, Colored Property, 12. 
17 Ibid., 9. 
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be as well because apparently neutral market forces, not personal attitudes or beliefs, explained 
any changes within the city. By using the entity of “the market,” whites were able to, once again, 
deny the existence of racism in certain practices while also denying the concept of white 
privilege in the housing market.18 The discussion of property from this particular lens adds to 
previous conversations of residential segregation in post-war cities by concentrating on specific 
tactics used by the government and citizens, particularly white citizens, to justify certain actions. 
However, what is missing is the presence of Black voices and their experiences and 
interpretations of the housing market, legislative tactics, and, ultimately, residential segregation 
in the City and suburbs of Detroit.  
Gilbert Osofsky, James R. Grossman, Arnold R. Hirsch, Thomas J. Sugrue, and David 
M.P. Freund lay out many aspects of the Black urban experience upon settlement in Northern 
cities that had a profound impact on their daily lives. What can be further explored, however, are 
the actions and structural forces that created a Black sense of place and the physical effects that 
these experiences had on Black bodies. Katherine McKittrick seeks to fill that void in her article 
“On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place.” Her research suggests that the ways in 
which Black communities are spatially configured are intertwined with “practices of domination 
and deliberate attempts to destroy a Black sense of place.”19 McKittrick points to the history of 
Black persons in America and the structural constructions of what it means to be labeled as 
Black, which equates to being a body “without.” Through this perception, Black bodies are seen 
as being incapable of having certain rights, whether that is rights to land, rights to freedom, or 
rights to social inclusion. These lacks of rights form the ideas behind the fluctuating definition of 
                                                           
18 Ibid., 37, 207 & 249.  
19 Katherine McKittrick, “On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place,” Social and Cultural Geography, 
12(8), December 2011, 947. 
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racism, the creation of specified places for Black cultures, and the structural denial of a place for 
Black people within the larger United States society.20 
Time and time again, policies have been put into place to erase the rich history and 
culture of America’s Black population, whether it is during the times of slavery and plantations 
or through the continual imprisonment of Black bodies.21 McKittrick also identifies instances of 
urbicide as examples of the historical erasure of a Black sense of place. She defines urbicide as 
“the deliberate death of the city and willful place annihilation” and suggests that Black 
communities suffer disproportionately from urbicide by means of environmental, social, and 
infrastructural decay.22 In this way, a Black sense of place is destroyed by the physical and 
psychological destruction of the spaces that Black people have been forced to inhabit.23 
One way in which the concept of urbicide is exemplified is through the historical 
upheaval known as urban renewal. This mid-1900s movement was expressed as uneven 
development in central cities, which solidified seemingly natural “links between [B]lackness, 
underdevelopment, poverty, and place.”24 During this urban renewal time period, Black 
communities, those “without,” were specifically targeted and, thus, urban renewal acts became 
racialized and continued to shape the environments of Black people, facilitating the definition of 
a Black sense of place. The perspective of McKittrick is crucial to the conversations surrounding 
urban renewal efforts of the past, present, and future as it calls for a reformation of our current 
knowledge of systems that affect Black people.25 The concept of urbicide can aid scholars in this 
                                                           
20 Ibid., 948-949. 
21 Ibid., 952 - 955. 
22 Ibid., 951.  
23 Ibid., 947 & 951.  
24 Ibid., 951. 
25 Ibid., 955. 
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reformation when looking at how cities came to produce their current physical structure and how 
decisions of the past have placed and forced Black people into their current situations. 
Mindy Thompson Fullilove delves into the psychological effects of urbicide surrounding 
the urban renewal years in her book Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts 
America, and What We Can Do About It. As a psychiatrist, Fullilove attempted to conceive of a 
term that would fully capture and portray the emotional pain that accompanies displacement 
from the point of view of those who directly experience it. It is through the exploration of the 
personal histories of those displaced, predominantly because of urban renewal projects, that she 
coins the concept of “root shock.”26 Fullilove broadly defines root shock as “the traumatic stress 
reaction to the destruction of all or part of one’s emotional ecosystem.”27 While this particular 
terminology is quite general, she breaks this concept up into multiple “levels” so that the reader 
can fully grasp the concept and the magnitude of root shock.  
Fullilove begins with the level of the individual, stating that root shock manifests itself as 
“a profound emotional upheaval that destroys the working model of the world that had existed in 
the individual’s head… [which] undermines trust, increases anxiety about letting loved ones out 
of one’s sight, destabilizes relationships, destroys social, emotional, and financial resources, and 
increases the risk for every kind of stress-related disease…”28 At the community level, root 
shock physically destroys neighborhoods and the bonds created in neighborhood settings. 
Fullilove notes that community level root shock spreads out among members of the destroyed 
community to other areas of a social or geographic space; even if areas are recreated with the 
same individuals, the negative effects of the initial upheaval are irreparable. She also notes that it 
                                                           
26
 Mindy Thompson Fullilove, Root Shock: How Tearing Up City Neighborhoods Hurts America and What We Can 
Do About It (New York: Ballatine, 2004), 3. 
27 Ibid., 11. 
28 Ibid., 14. 
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is not only those directly affected by events that lead to root shock, but rather, entire societies 
and future generations are affected.29 Without looking at the social, economic, cultural, political, 
and emotional losses of Black America, the overall impacts of urban renewal efforts cannot be 
fully understood.30 
This thesis research project engages with many of the concepts introduced and explored 
by Osofsky, Grossman, Hirsch, Sugrue, Freund, McKittrick, and Fullilove while focusing on the 
City of Milwaukee, the Black community centered around Walnut Street, and the activism that 
residents exhibited in the face of the urban renewal destruction. The concepts that each of these 
scholars engage with informed the initial research for Chapter One of this work, guiding further 
examination of specific institutions on multiple scales directly related to the housing market and 
its influence on Black mobility and a Black sense of place. On a national level, institutions such 
as the HOLC, the FHLBB, and the federal government itself, adopted practices that directly 
contributed to the continued segregation present in the housing market. Similarly, on a local 
level, city governments and area residents collaborated to guarantee the continued confinement 
of Black populations. This research mirrors some of the discussion of what took place in Harlem, 
Chicago, and Detroit, participating in a conversation with Osofsky, Grossman, Hirsch, Sugrue, 
Freund, McKittrick, and Fullilove’s research. However, it also takes several pieces of their 
scholarship a step further to include the Black voice, Black experiences, and Black activism 
present in the City of Milwaukee.  
History specific to the City of Milwaukee was pulled from geographer John Gurda’s 
book The Making of Milwaukee, historian Joe William Trotter, Jr.’s book Black Milwaukee: The 
Making of an Industrial Proletariat 1915-45, historian Patrick Jones’s book The Selma of the 
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North: Civil Rights Insurgency in Milwaukee, and historian Paul Geib’s case study “From 
Mississippi to Milwaukee: A Case Study of Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 1940-
1970.” By utilizing these particular pieces of work, specifics to the City of Milwaukee were 
analyzed and reorganized to articulate the experiences of Black individuals and families in the 
contexts of migration, employment, housing, governmental actions, and urban renewal efforts. 
These pieces of scholarship were crucial in incorporating facts and figures into the larger 
conversation of the Black urban experience. In much the same way, archival materials from the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Public Library were utilized to capture 
the narrative of Milwaukee’s urban renewal efforts from the view of those who were directly 
involved in community activism and the preservation of a Black sense of place. 
It is important for scholars, researchers, academics, and everyday citizens to see the 
complete picture of the ways in which past events have impacted the entirety of society. This 
view allows us to engage with the full story of events from multiple perspectives, removing 
stigmas from certain portions of the population and minimizing unfair advantages. A complete 
picture ensures that similar mistakes will not be re-made and that advances are made for the good 
of the many, not the good of the few. The uncovering of complete histories can impact future 
legislation and ensure that decision makers and voters are engaging with legislation geared 
towards the good of the many, not the good of the few. We should always be working towards 
creating a scholarship of truth, which is why events of the distant past are continually being 
revisited.  
Through the use of Milwaukee’s Walnut Street and the communities created around it, 
this thesis research project argues that despite popular perception, Black citizens were not idle in 
the instances when urban renewal projects threated to displace their community members, 
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destroy cultural districts, and erase the histories of entire areas and entire groups of people. 
Instead, under the direction of local residents, neighborhood citizens, community organizations, 
and decision makers were engaged in actions that impacted the direct environment in ways 
deemed acceptable to those directly affected. This conversation and exploration will contribute 
to the creation of a complete history of the Black urban experience in Milwaukee and has the 
potential to lead futures scholars to explore the experiences, particularly in terms of grassroots 
and community led activism, of other Black communities throughout the United States.  
 
From South to North: The Great Migration 
The Great Migration of Black people from the Southern United States constitutes a 
period of time from 1910 to 1960 when over six million Black people left the South in search of 
new employment opportunities and a better life for themselves and their families.31 The North 
offered higher employment wages and an escape from Southern sharecropping, social rejection, 
and violence for Black people.32As James R. Grossman discusses in his investigation of the 
Great Migration in Chicago, many white residents sympathized with migrating Southern Blacks, 
but ultimately viewed them as “ignorant, degraded, and helpless refugees.”33 The burden of 
adaptation or adjustment to the accepted way of life, directed by white individuals and 
institutions, was placed solely on Black migrants. Pieces of Black culture that did not fit into the 
“norm” of Northern life were looked at unfavorably and led to the snubbing of newly arriving 
Black migrants.34 The Chicago Defender, a newspaper published by Black Chicago residents, put 
together a list of “do’s and don’t’s” to inform readers of acceptable and unacceptable 
                                                           
31 Grossman, Land of Hope, 19. 
32 Osofsky, Harlem, 21. 
33 Grossman, Land of Hope, 162. 
34 Ibid., 162-163.  
  
15 
behaviors.35 This fear of social rejection and the subsequent creation of a set of guidelines can be 
seen as a negation of the escape from social rejection Black people faced in the South. However, 
this was often not revealed until Black people had already put down roots in Northern cities and 
did not necessarily slow the influx of Black migrants. Although the Great Migration took place 
over the course of fifty years, a large majority of migrants left their Southern roots during the 
years surrounding WWI and WWII.  
Due to the passing of federal migration quota laws, the immigration of Europeans to the 
United States slowed from over one million in 1914 to fewer than 150,000 in 1925.36 This 
decrease in the number of European immigrants created an opportunity for migrating Black 
people to become employed as laborers in Northern cities. With the onset of both WWI and 
WWII, the demand for war related goods, such as uniforms, bomb materials, and vehicles, and 
laborers increased exponentially.37 While the bulk of Southern migrants settled in large cities like 
New York City, Chicago, and Philadelphia, others chose smaller, but still heavily manufacturing 
based cities as Milwaukee.38 
Milwaukee became a logical site for the importing and exporting of goods because of its 
proximity to both railway lines and waterways. Breweries, flour mills, tanneries, and industrial 
manufacturing companies established themselves in Milwaukee during the first half of the 20th 
century, creating a pool of employment opportunities for Southern Black people.39 From 1910 to 
1930, the Black population in Milwaukee grew from 980 to 7,501 and from 1950 to 1970, the 
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Black population increased from 21,772 to 105,088.40 Table 1 exhibits the tremendous growth of 
Milwaukee’s Black population from the 1930s through the 1970s. 
Table 1. Black Population Growth in the City of Milwaukee, 1930-1970 
 
Source: United States Census Population, 1930-1970. (Paul E. Geib, “The Late 
Great Migration: A Case Study of Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 
1940-1970,” The Journal of Negro History, 83(4) 1998, 231. 
 
 
Black Employment  
Largely employed in agricultural sectors and as domestic servants in the South, many 
Black people had to transition to different forms of work, gaining skills in the rapidly growing 
manufacturing sector with companies like Allis-Chalmers, Bucyris-Erie, A.O. Smith, and 
Harley-Davidson.41 These companies specialized in the production of engines, generators, steam 
shovels, water heaters, and motorcycles.42 Labor agents roamed Southern cities in search of 
workers for these growing companies, increasing the Black workforce in industrial jobs to 80 
percent by the 1930s.43  
Milwaukee became a powerhouse of manufacturing materials for the war effort. Utilizing 
already established companies, such as Allis-Chalmers and Harley-Davidson, goods were 
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produced for the Allied forces.44 Plant expansion accounted for $270 million of federal monies to 
keep up with demands; this expansion augmented the need for laborers and, with many white 
males enlisted in the armed forces, increased the demand for Black workers.45 Paired with 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1941 Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) that prohibited 
racial discrimination in defense industries, a road was paved for Black employment in 
Milwaukee. The skills that Southern Black people procured through previous employment as 
sharecroppers, day laborers, grocery store workers, and the few opportunities open to them in 
manufacturing positions served them well in the North. 46 
Some Northern employers, however, took advantage of the perceived conditions of Black 
employment in the South. Many employers were under the impression that because these newly 
arrived migrants came from Southern states, they had an exceptional ability to work in the heat 
and, thus, were hired on to work in positions that were “hot, dirty, and low-paying.”47 As an 
example, the A.O. Smith Corporation became a large producer of bombs during the war. Because 
of the nature of bomb-making, A.O. Smith laborers were forced to work in an environment that 
exceeded 105 degrees Fahrenheit and was extremely loud. Mississippi sharecroppers were 
recruited for these positions based on the belief that they could handle the heat and noise. This 
recruitment shifted the demographics of A.O. Smith employees to over 80 percent identifying as 
Black.48 Other companies hired Black people for the most undesirable positions, such as 
removing hair from hides at local tanneries, or as janitors, porters, and common laborers. 
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Promotions for Black laborers were also difficult to come by. Locally based Allis-Chalmers was 
known for denying promotions to skilled Black laborers based solely on race.49 
Although many Milwaukee employers practiced some forms of racism in the workplace, 
the labor shortage in more desirable positions could not be denied and Milwaukee employers 
began to hire Black laborers more and more frequently. In 1943, a representative of the 
Milwaukee Urban League (MUL) stated, “For the first time in over a decade Negro labor was 
actually sought by heavy industry. Today there is hardly a Negro man in Milwaukee who is 
physically able and willing to work who is not employed.”50 Through the war years, Black 
people continued to be employed by the industrial and manufacturing firms of Milwaukee and 
worked their way up to higher positions in companies like A.O. Smith and American Motors.51 
Following the end of WWII, the demand for war supplies declined and many Milwaukee 
based manufacturing companies were crippled. Coupled with this decline, the job market became 
saturated with returning veterans; consequently, Black laborers were no longer in high demand 
and were often fired to accommodate returning veterans, creating very unstable financial 
environments for families that relied on this income.52 By the 1960s, Black male unemployment 
figures hovered around 10 percent.53 From the end of the 1960s continuing into the early 1970s, 
Milwaukee saw over seventy-six companies close completely, leaving over 16,000 workers, 
Black and white, without a job.54 With mounting pressure from federal entities, Black people 
were invited into segments of the labor force that were not traditionally open to them. They were 
encouraged to apply to become brewery workers, nurses, salespeople, and trolley drivers.55  
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Even with the rise of Black workers in these unconventional fields, many businesses left 
the central city to create roots in suburbs and outlying areas. From 1960 to 1970, Milwaukee jobs 
located in the central city declined by over 10 percent as jobs outside of the city increased by 
over 75 percent.56 With limited access to personal vehicles and without public transportation 
lines extended to these areas, unemployment rates among Black residents increased even further. 
As in Grossman’s discussion of neighboring Chicago, each of these occurrences added to the 
tumultuous financial condition of Milwaukee’s Black residents in achieving independence from 
larger societal ties. 
 
Black Housing and the Creation of the Inner City  
Immigrant populations seeking to create their own sense of place in a new area settled 
into Milwaukee’s neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were often made up of several square 
blocks, which allowed for the maintenance of culture and solidarity and became a source of 
pride. Milwaukee’s inner city was initially inhabited by German, Jewish, Greek, Slovak, and 
Croatian immigrants.57 As the Black population continued to rise, they inherited “hand-me-down 
neighborhoods left behind as early residents moved out to greener pastures.”58 As in Osofsky’s 
exploration of Harlem, Milwaukee’s immigrant groups left in massive numbers as the influx of 
Black people continued to increase, further opening up this central city area for Black settlement. 
Although this choice in location may seem to be purely that, a choice, other factors influenced 
where Black people were able to live within the city. Structural racism, which manifests itself in 
redlining, housing discrimination, labor market discrimination, and social perceptions of race, 
along with the subsequent deindustrialization of Milwaukee all had significant influences over 
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the neighborhoods and areas in which Black people were able to live. In addition, as James R. 
Grossman suggests, the desire of Black residents to avoid white prejudices combined with 
aspirations to retain cultural customs impelled Black residents into particular neighborhoods.59 
While these influences created an environment that generally appeased Milwaukee’s 
white population, Black residents came together to influence the spaces they were forced into to 
benefit their community as a whole. Black people established businesses, bought homes, created 
carpools and walking routes to work, and enjoyed a rich culture in the spaces into which they 
were forced and, ultimately, confined. Neighborhoods throughout the United States that were 
transforming to be predominately Black were given nicknames such as “Coontown,” “Nigger 
Alley,” Nigger Row,” “The Black Belt,” and “Darktown,” to further designate them as areas 
reserved for Black residents.60 Figure 1 shows the increase in the Black population in 
Milwaukee’s central city from the 1940s to the 1960s and the areas to which they were 
contained. 
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Figure 1: Geographic Distribution of the Nonwhite Population of Milwaukee in 1940, 1950, and 
1960. Source: Unknown article title and author, Milwaukee Sentinel, February 8, 1967, Folder 29, Box 2, 
Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Architects Records 1936-1990, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Archives. 
 
Milwaukee historian John Gurda suggests, “[w]here the races met, the encounter quickly 
assumed the oil-and-water character that typified the urban North.”61 White residents did not 
easily understand Black culture and their “way of life” was seen as something unpleasant, 
tainting relationships between neighbors and resulting heavily in white flight to the suburbs of 
Milwaukee.62 These perceptions were fueled by the dialogue surrounding the influx of Black 
individuals and families and what effects they would have on surrounding areas. Many left the 
central city to escape perceived declining property values, increasing crime rates, blight, slum 
areas, and a failing educational system.63 
Most prominently, real estate workers and housing reformers perpetuated ideologies 
suggesting that there was an emerging Black ghetto that was a “pathological, dangerous and 
                                                          
61
 Gurda, Making of Milwaukee, 362. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Jones, Selma of the North, 26.  
  
22 
nefarious place, to be avoided by whites and other ethnic groups.”64 Large organizations, such as 
the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), published printed materials for 
distribution, warning realtors of the threats minorities posed and pushed the idea that only 
homogenized neighborhoods were stable and desirable. As early as the mid-1920s, real estate 
boards in Milwaukee approved measures to encourage the maintenance of racial segregation.65 
Just to the south of Milwaukee, the Chicago Real Estate Board suggested similar housing 
segregation ordinances and petitioned the Chicago City Council to prohibit “further migration of 
‘colored families’ to Chicago until such time as the city could work out ‘reasonable restrictions’ 
to ‘prevent lawlessness, destruction of values and property and loss of life.’”66 On a national 
scale, the NAREB officially incorporated legal discrimination into its code of ethics by stating 
that realtors “should never be instrumental in introducing… members of any race or 
nationality… whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in the 
neighborhood.”67 
White flight and dominant perceptions of the inner city caused a large amount of homes 
to be left vacant. In response, these homes were often sold at low prices and converted into 
multi-family dwellings with rooming houses for boarders; other dwellings were transformed into 
rental properties or sold to loan associations, realtors, and slum investors. These loan 
associations, realtors, and investors then practiced discriminatory procedures, such as restrictive 
housing covenants and redlining, using the language described above, to keep Black people 
contained to certain areas of the city.68  
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Racially restrictive housing covenants were “contractual agreements between property 
owners and neighborhood associations that prohibited the sale, occupancy or lease of property 
and land to certain racial groups, especially [B]lacks.”69 These housing covenants were often put 
into place in newly developing subdivisions or suburbs, but were also used within the city to 
negatively impact the mobility of Black people during the early half of the 20th century.70 
Redlining is defined as, “the avoidance and/or withdrawal of financial investments in some urban 
areas and the concentration in other urban or suburban areas.”71 Banks, savings and loan 
organizations, and insurance institutions have been charged with utilizing redlining tactics to 
keep Black homeownership rates down and to disinvest in neighborhoods deemed undesirable, 
subsequently making homeownership less attainable.72  
One tactic linked to redlining was the creation of “Residential Security Maps” by the 
Home Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). 
These maps were created in 239 different cities, including Milwaukee, to appraise real estate risk 
levels with each section of the city being assigned a grade. Each grade corresponded with a 
color, first grade (A) represented by green, second grade (B) represented by blue, third grade (C) 
represented by yellow, and fourth grade (D) represented by red, hence the term redlining. Figure 
2 displays the coloration designation legend from a Residential Security Map of Milwaukee from 
1938. 
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Figure 2: 1938 Milwaukee Residential Security Map Coloration Designations. 
Source: Map of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin: Residential Security Map, United States 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Division of Research and Statistics, 1938, University 
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee American Geographical Society Library Digital Map 
Collection. 
 
Coloration determination was based on the “age of [area] buildings, their condition, the 
amenities and infrastructure in the neighborhood… the level of racial, ethnic, and economic 
homogeneity, [and] the absence or presence of ‘a lower grade population,’” in most cases, Black 
individuals and families.73 Additionally, those areas rated third (C), or yellow, and fourth (D), or 
red, contained residents who were unlikely to receive mortgage approval or home loans for the 
purchasing of properties, even if properties they were interested in purchasing were outside of 
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the areas in which the resident currently resided. Similarly, those interested in developing land or 
properties contained within the third (C) or fourth (D) grade were often denied the financial 
backing for construction projects. As a result, Residential Security Maps were highly effective in 
creating further racial segregation and exacerbating the decline of certain sections of the city.74 
Figure 3 displays the entire 1938 Residential Security Map of Milwaukee, clearly indicating a 
fourth (D) grade for the section of the municipality known of as the inner city. 
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Figure 3: 1938 Residential Security Map with Inner City Demarcation. Adapted 
from: Map of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin: Residential Security Map, United States 
Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Division of Research and Statistics, 1938, University 
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee American Geographical Society Library Digital Map 
Collection. 
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As David M.P. Freund discusses, Residential Security Maps represented a “fundamental 
transformation in the way that whites’ racial preferences shaped the [housing] market.”75 By 
utilizing large organizations, such as the HOLC and the FHLBB, the desires of white citizens 
were expressed through state-regulated and state-funded systems that directly influenced how 
people bought homes, who was able to purchase homes, and what sections of the city homes 
could be purchased. These organizations, in turn, were able to manipulate the conversation 
regarding racial discrimination and exclusion in the housing market from that of a segregationist 
ideology to a product of economics.76 The actions of the HOLC and FHLBB continued to fuel 
negative views of Milwaukee’s Black population by creating racially segregated conditions in 
order to perpetuate the dominant perception of the Black populace manifested through white 
ideologies.  
The inclusion of these types of policies coincided with a change in the discussion of race 
and place. The presence of Black bodies in certain areas was now connected with the physical 
deterioration of neighborhoods, rising crime rates, and many other negative attributes through the 
use of specific jargon.77 Central cities were now being referred to as the “inner city” or as 
“slums” based on the presence of a condition coined “blight.” The definitions of these terms 
were plagued with negative connotations and were thrust upon the Black community with little 
hesitation. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines the terms “inner city,” “slum,” and “blight” 
in the following ways: 
Inner City: “the central section of a large city where mostly poor people live”78 
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Slum: “an area of a city where poor people live and the buildings are in bad condition” or 
“a very untidy place”79 
Blight: “something that causes harm or damage like a disease” or “a damaged 
condition”80 
 
What is interesting to note is that the term “blight” can be said to have the ability to take on two 
different implications: the blight of people and the blight of physical structures.81 The use of 
these terms in everyday discourse directly contributed to the perceived conditions of these 
labeled sections of the city and the people who lived in them, primarily Black residents. 
At the time that this shift in discourse was occurring, roughly 2 percent of Black people 
owned their own homes while the remaining 98 percent were forced to rent from landlords.82 
Studies have concluded that the 2 percent of Black people who did own homes often paid more 
than the value of their homes when purchasing in Black neighborhoods.83 While these rates did 
increase in the decades that followed, the percentage of Black homeowners pales in comparison 
to that of white homeowners.84 In addition to the structural tactics used to specifically ban Black 
people from homeownership, such as white real estate workers refusing to work with Black 
clientele, restrictive housing covenants, and redlining, Thomas J. Sugrue points to the issue of 
finances. Black individuals were faced with the reality that they were paid much less than their 
white counterparts and were often the first to be let go in times of economic strife. In addition, a 
large percentage of Black residents’ paychecks were devoted to overpriced rental options.85 
Table 2 shows the percentage of Black homeowners versus white homeowners in the City of 
Milwaukee from the 1940s through the 1980s. 
                                                           
79 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “slum,” accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/slum. 
80 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “blight,” accessed November 5, 2015, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/blight. 
81 Rachel Weber, “Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment,” Antipode, 34(3) July 
2002, 521-522. 
82 Jones, Selma of the North, 19.  
83 Sunwoong Kim, “Race and Home Price Appreciation in Urban Neighborhoods: Evidence from Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin,” The Review of Black Political Economy, 28(2) 2000, 10. 
84 Geib, “From Mississippi to Milwaukee,” 241. 
85 Sugrue, Origins of the Urban Crisis, 34.  
  
29 
Table 2. Black Home Owners and White Home Owners for the City of Milwaukee, 1940-
1980 
 
 
Source: Paul E. Geib, “The Late Great Migration: A Case Study of Southern Black Migration to Milwaukee, 1940-
1970,” The Journal of Negro History, 83(4) 1998, 241. 
 
Accordingly, Milwaukee’s Black residents were forced to rent homes and to occupy the 
spaces offered to them, creating a large demand for a small number of units in a specified area. 
This, in turn, allowed landlords to raise rent anywhere from 30 percent to 200 percent, as they 
knew Black people did not have many other housing choices. In Osofsky’s exploration of 
Harlem, he found that Black residents paid, on average, $3 more per room, per month than their 
white counterparts.86 Although specific figures for Milwaukee were not found, it can be assumed 
that discrepancies between Black and white renters were comparable to those found in Harlem. 
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Black renters often had to take in lodgers in order to pay this exorbitant rent, severely cramping 
living quarters and creating an unsanitary environment.87 
Milwaukee was also plagued with a large number of absentee landlords who, once they 
rented their aging structures to Black individuals and families, stopped paying attention to their 
properties based on the undesirable locations and the color of the renter’s skin. This fact only 
contributed to the decline in the physical features of the property and the market value of homes 
that Black people were forced to live in. These dilapidating homes also affected the larger 
aesthetic value of the neighborhood, causing other landlords to disinvest in and under-maintain 
their properties.88 These racialized influences forced Black people “deeper and deeper into the 
most dilapidated sections of the urban housing market.”89 In 1946, 67 percent of Milwaukee’s 
Black population lived in homes that were seen as unfit or largely dilapidated.90  
By the 1960s, the inner city expanded to six times the size of the area it covered in the 
1950s.91 Conditions within the inner city rapidly declined as the housing stock continued to age, 
resources became more and more scarce, and poverty increased. Addressing these issues would 
quickly become controversial and thoroughly debated at the expense of Milwaukee’s Black 
community. 
 
Milwaukee’s Urban Renewal  
White flight in the housing market coalesced with deindustrialization during the mid-
twentieth century to trigger a significant loss in Milwaukee’s central city tax base. This loss 
directly caused the decline of funding for social services and public schools, impacting crime 
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rates and increasing the number of boarded up homes and vacant lots.92 A 1939 survey 
conducted by Works Progress Administration found that only 7 percent of the homes contained 
in Milwaukee’s inner city were in good physical condition, while more than 75 percent were 
considered substandard.93 This deterioration of the central business district and surrounding 
residential neighborhoods was not unique to Milwaukee. Cities across the United States were 
feeling the effects of the culmination of WWII and the abandonment of the central city by 
businesses and white citizens. By the late 1940s, governmental entities, both local and federal, 
were forced to take action.  
Milwaukee’s local response came in the form of the 1948 Corporation, later known as the 
Greater Milwaukee Committee. This group was formed as a non-partisan, non-political, non-
sectional group aimed at community improvement, particularly through the construction of 
“quality of life projects” such as a sports arena, a professional baseball stadium, libraries, and 
museums.94 On a larger scale, the federal government ratified Title I of the Housing Act in 1949, 
which encouraged central cities and central business districts to engage in the revitalization of 
“decaying” urban areas. More widely known as urban renewal, this program caught the eyes of 
city planners, mayors, social welfare leaders, journalists, private business owners, and the 
general public who saw this program as an opportunity to restore cities to their former glory.95 
While each of these groups and individuals imagined urban renewal projects differently, initial 
thoughts surrounding urban renewal suggested that these efforts would be effective in “clear[ing] 
and rehabilitat[ing] ‘slums’ and ‘blight’ and [would] build new modern housing, commercial, 
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and institutional complexes in postwar central cities” utilizing federal funds.96 These efforts were 
seen as a means to increase central city property values and tax revenues, to create better living 
conditions for the poor, and to help cities become more economically viable.97 As Arnold R. 
Hirsch and David M. P. Freund suggest, the increased involvement of the government reinforced 
racial segregation and allowed it to become a permanent part of city life. Prior to formalized 
legislation targeting slums and blight in central cities, agreements amongst realtors and 
landlords, restrictive housing covenants, and redlining were the most influential forces in 
determining the residential patterns of Black community members. As governmental entities put 
urban renewal legislation into place and shaped public policies regarding redevelopment, the 
interests of private supporters trumped moral obligations to “voiceless” central city residents, 
mainly low-income Black residents. 98 Thus, while the romanticism of urban renewal projects 
lasted through the first few years, these ulterior motives were soon uncovered and it was 
discovered that these projects sought to continue to intentionally destroy a Black sense of place 
and perpetuate racial segregation and discrimination. 
As with discourse regarding the inner city, terminology included in urban renewal 
legislation was fraught with powerful meanings. In addition to the inclusion of the term blight 
and slum, renewal is defined as “the state of being made new, fresh, or strong.”99 This term 
suggests that the areas slated for urban renewal projects were dead or in the process of dying, 
which heavily influenced the standards created by federal and local officials in order to create a 
“healthy” city. Local leaders used the amount of perceived blight present to determine which 
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neighborhoods to demolish in the name of renewal efforts. Thus, blight became the “primary 
justification for creative destruction.”100 
The term creative destruction has been used in various contexts to explore many facets of 
the economy, particularly when discussing properties of capitalism. Rachel Weber, Urban 
Planning and Policy Professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago, refers to this creative 
destruction in her article “Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban 
Redevelopment.” She cites the desire of local municipalities to dispose of degraded properties, or 
blight, to make way for new investment opportunities. These projects were put in place without 
regard to the people, places, and businesses that were directly affected. Ordinances and statues 
were crafted to intentionally define blight in vague ways so that essentially any reason for the 
destruction of a building or property was justified.101 Planners from the American Public Health 
Association justified decisions by referencing specific characteristics, such as the age of 
buildings, population gain and loss, structural deterioration, and health statistics, to determine 
what blight was and where it was happening. Other urban reformers also cited the “high 
correlation between poverty and congestion… and disease and death.”102  
Using these techniques, blight was often disproportionally found in areas that housed 
non-white residents. The people that made these area-wide decisions were far removed from the 
immediate environment and, thus, validated their decisions for destruction because of the 
positive impacts renewal was supposed to have on the economic viability of the central city. In 
this way, creative destruction was utilized to manipulate larger public perceptions of urban 
renewal efforts while having the completely opposite effect on those that were directly impacted 
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by these decisions.103 These tactics were put into place to justify urban renewal ventures in cities 
throughout the United States, including Milwaukee. 
Milwaukee Mayor Frank P. Zeidler was elected to office in 1948 on the platform that he 
would not add any debt that would affect Milwaukee’s shining credit rating. However, he 
quickly acknowledged that the problems of the inner city, including the withdrawal of 
businesses, were too much for the City to handle on its own. While he initially borrowed 
approximately $13 million in 1948, this amount quickly increased as project after project 
suggested by the 1948 Corporation and other entities were approved in the name of urban 
renewal. Large projects intended to bring visitors and their money back to the city were 
completed, including a convention arena in 1950 and Milwaukee County Stadium in 1953.104 In 
addition, in order to accommodate potential tourists and those residents living in outlying 
suburbs, the State Highway Commission planned the first segments of a six-lane highway, the 
Interstate 43 (I-43) expressway, and construction was begun in March of 1952.105 As was the 
case in many cities experiencing large amounts of urban renewal construction, the creation of 
interstates and highways coincided with the razing of large numbers of housing structures 
deemed unfit. However, what these roadways were often used as were “handy devices for razing 
slums,” as discussed in Thomas J. Sugrue’s The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality 
in Postwar Detroit. A 1950 Milwaukee Journal article called the North Side of Milwaukee a 
“dilapidated, overcrowded tinder box.”106 In response, Mayor Zeidler ordered 10,000 housing 
units to be torn down.107 By masking urban renewal projects as progressive approaches to central 
city revitalization, larger issues, such as the displacement of thousands of individuals and 
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families, were largely ignored. In addition, state highway commissions had no legal obligation to 
assist displaced residents in finding alternative housing options.108 Instead, the housing that 
remained became increasingly overcrowded and decrepit. 
Many local state and real estate entities, such as the HOLC and the NAREB, continued to 
push for the bulldozer approach to derelict housing, stating that rehabilitation would “only 
perpetuate bad land patterns and provide no lasting solution” to urban blight.109 These entities 
argued that by completely eliminating blighted structures and, in turn, blighted people, the 
possibility of blight enduring in central cities would be lessened dramatically.110 It can be argued 
that the opinions of these entities prevailed and bulldozers continued their reign of destruction. 
Not surprisingly, these bulldozers meant an increase in Black people seeking out alternate 
housing options and overcrowding already packed dwellings in Black neighborhoods throughout 
the United States, Milwaukee being no exception. 
As more and more residents became displaced due to these projects, negative sentiment 
towards urban renewal gained steam. The federal government responded by passing the Housing 
Act of 1954 that sought to switch the aims of legislation from renewal to redevelopment. 
However, large projects requiring the extensive demolition of existing neighborhoods and 
structures continued to dominate approved urban renewal “improvements.” A new terminal was 
completed at Mitchell Field in 1955, the State Teachers College and the University Extension 
were combined to create the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 1956, and the War Memorial 
and Milwaukee Art Center opened their doors in 1957. In addition to the construction of the I-43 
expressway that was already taking place, the Park East Freeway was added to Milwaukee’s 
transportation plans in 1958. Ground was broken for the construction of the Park East freeway 
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and hundreds of homes and businesses along Fond du Lac Avenue were demolished.111 To fund 
the continued expansion for these expressways, the City of Milwaukee solicited 90 percent of the 
costs from the federal government.112 By 1956, Mayor Zeidler increased Milwaukee’s debt to 
over $55 million.113  
Although some saw these large projects as triumphs in the name of urban renewal, out of 
the 10,000 units of unfit housing torn down, only one low-income housing project, Hillside 
Terrace, was constructed to house displaced residents. The construction of Hillside Terrace, and 
many other proposals throughout the United States, were met with heightened resistance from 
one section of the public because of the population that they would be housing: displaced Black 
individuals and families. Popular societal views of the time place Black people in a precarious 
position. Black residents were essentially kicked out of their homes due to “increasing blight,” 
the “improvement” of the downtown area, and the creation of an expressway for primarily white 
users. At this same time, they were not provided with many other housing options as they were 
barred from living in newly constructed buildings and properties and no additional public 
housing was being created because of pressure from the larger community. Public housing 
geared towards senior citizens and returning veterans, on the other hand, was met with little 
outside opposition.114 Housing discrimination continued due to larger societal pushes to control 
the housing options that Black residents had. 
The absence of Black representation in the political realm further contributed to the 
negative consequences of the choices made by those in power. By 1956, only one Black 
individual held a political position of power in Milwaukee: Vel Phillips. Phillips was 
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Milwaukee’s first female and first Black alderman on the Common Council and remained so for 
the next twelve years.115 While Phillips attempted to uncover many of Milwaukee’s legislative 
shortcomings in topics relevant to its Black population, white males she served with on the 
Common Council often suppressed her ideas and her voice. Gradual political progress in terms 
of Black representation and the Black voice, paired with white labor market domination and 
discrimination in the housing market, continued to contribute to the difficult situation for 
Milwaukee’s Black community. Consequently, urban renewal projects that had a negative impact 
on primarily Black areas of the city continued.  
After years of large projects focused on creating and expanding tourist attractions and 
existing Milwaukee staples, Mayor Frank P. Zeidler committed himself to the clearance of slum 
areas and the creation of public housing as “basic obligations of a civil society” and stressed that 
a “city is greatest which cares best for its submerged people.”116 Instead of using blanket federal 
solutions, Mayor Zeidler attempted to utilize local government entities, such as the Housing 
Authority and the Common Council, to analyze neighborhoods and find local solutions to local 
problems. Mayor Zeidler claimed that if inner city problems were increasing, the “entire 
community shared the blame for its prolonged tolerance of wretched living conditions.”117 This 
opinion was not widely shared, with many people in power taking the stance of “ignore [Black 
people]… and maybe they’ll go away.”118 
To explore the specific problems of Milwaukee’s inner city and to find potential 
solutions, in 1959, Mayor Zeidler commissioned a study to focus on what he termed the “social 
problems of the inner core.” This study explored many topics, including public welfare, problem 
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families, education, community facilities and programs, housing, and law enforcement, while 
noting that these topics and the problems uncovered were not entirely unique to Milwaukee.119 
While the boundaries of the inner city changed over time, Zeidler’s study committee defined it as 
Keefe Avenue to the north, Juneau Avenue to the south, the Milwaukee River and Holton Street 
to the east, and Twentieth Street to the west.120 Figure 4 represents the designated boundaries of 
Milwaukee’s inner city, as defined by Zeidler’s Study Committee. 
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Figure 4: Mayor’s Study Committee on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area 
of the City Boundaries of the Inner City Map. Source: Mayor’s Study Committee 
on Social Problems in the Inner Core Area of the City, Final Report to the Honorable 
Frank P. Zeidler, Mayor, City of Milwaukee, April 15, 1960, Annex A. 
In terms of housing, the final report lists several reasons why the housing stock in the 
inner core was in a state of decline. These reasons include the devaluation of cleanliness and 
orderliness of homes by Black residents, absentee ownership, zoning laws, over-occupancy and 
overcrowding, real estate and mortgage discrimination practices, and the absence of private 
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construction interest. 121 In order to combat these ills, the Subcommittee on Housing Conditions 
and Availability suggested that the city create additional studies and reviews to determine 
specifics related to zoning laws, the regulation of tenants versus landlord responsibilities, 
property taxes, mortgage and real estate practices, and displacement due to urban renewal 
projects. It also explicitly states “…housing segregation is the fundamental human relations 
problem in [N]orthern urban communities. The pattern of housing segregation denies the Negro 
his place in society. To deny him free access to housing of his choice is contrary to 
democracy.”122 This study also recognizes that “facts and figures alone do not adequately 
describe the problem of housing in the inner core area because it is affected by experiences and 
attitudes” including both the attitudes of those who live in the “inner core” and those looking at 
inner city residents from the outside.123 Those conducting this study were fully aware that 
personal attitudes have an impact on problems in the inner city. However, the study itself 
continues to contribute to these negative perceptions stating that “Negroes customarily put no 
high prestige value on… mak[ing] cleanliness and orderliness of homes a matter of pride.”124 No 
effort was made by this particular study to understand why this might be the case. Thus, through 
this study, negative perceptions were perpetuated through the lack of a full understanding of the 
immediate environment of Milwaukee’s Black residents. 
This study commission praised Mayor Zeidler for his unique approach to clarifying and 
seeking out solutions to area problems. Zeidler was also commended for utilizing 100 individuals 
from various professions and backgrounds to undertake the many aspects of the study. Specific 
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backgrounds and demographics of these professionals, however, are not available within the 
study itself.125  
Initially commissioned by Mayor Zeidler, this report was not finalized until his successor, 
Henry W. Maier, took office in 1960. As such, many of the enlightening facts and suggestions 
that were uncovered and discussed within the study were disregarded. Mayor Maier insisted that 
Zeidler’s study findings were an undeniable “…mass of facts, figures, statistics, and bleak 
reports.”126 Additionally, Maier did not share the same sentiments about local involvement in 
social issues as his predecessor. Instead of attempting to utilize local entities to solve the city’s 
problems and save money, he stressed that only through the engagement of the federal 
government could Milwaukee save itself. Maier wanted to rely more heavily on federal monies 
and federal legislation.127  
Public and private development continued as Milwaukee gained the Marine Bank 
headquarters in 1962, a new home for its Public Museum and County Zoo, both in 1962, and the 
Mitchell Park Horticulture Domes between 1964 and 1967.128 The Interstate Highway System 
continued to expand and over fifty-six additional miles were added to plans by 1967, bringing 
the total construction mileage to just over eighty.129 To accommodate these additional miles, 
14,219 homes were demolished, displacing innumerable individuals and families, over 50 
percent of which were Black.130 Again, this position was not unique to Milwaukee. Nationwide, 
the majority of neighborhoods demolished by urban renewal efforts housed the nation’s Black 
population. Out of an estimated 2,500 neighborhoods razed by urban renewal efforts in 993 cities 
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nationwide, 1,600 of them were Black communities.131 Thus, urban renewal became known as 
“Negro removal” and came to symbolize the erasure of entire histories of the Black people that 
inhabited these spaces.132 
While he continued to ignore the need for public housing, Mayor Maier attempted to 
establish a “blight line,” pushed for the construction of a luxury high-rise apartment complex 
named Juneau Village, and authorized the demolition of entire square blocks around Marquette 
University and Haymarket Square on the North Side for university expansion and industrial and 
commercial redevelopment.133 As discussed in Hirsch’s investigation of post-WWII Chicago, 
many of these projects can be viewed as reclamation of space for middle-class residents’ 
consumption instead of being used to restore spaces for those displaced by construction, 
primarily poor Black residents.  
Though some saw Milwaukee’s redevelopment projects as pitiful in comparison to other 
large cities, residents complained the “city was going too far… reducing every project area to 
rubble and then starting over from scratch” and that there was no input from those who were 
directly affected.134 While there was a significant opposition movement brewing, it was eclipsed 
by the push for school desegregation in the City of Milwaukee and throughout the nation.135 As 
in cities nationwide, the creation and expansion of businesses, expressways, local social service 
agencies, and arbitrary housing resolutions were only pieces of the revitalization puzzle in 
Milwaukee. 
 
Conclusion 
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Though many of the same themes and arguments from existing scholarship concerning 
post-WWII cities are similar to those found when looking at post-WWII Milwaukee, it is 
important to look at cities individually as the manifestation of these themes and arguments can 
be drastically different. Milwaukee’s Black population was impacted heavily by structural racism 
in the form of restrictive housing covenants, redlining, housing discrimination, labor market 
discrimination, and social perceptions of race. Each of these components impacted the areas of 
Milwaukee in which Black people were permitted to live. As businesses and white central city 
residents began migrating out of the downtown area into suburbs, Black residents were unable to 
join, perpetuating racial segregation in housing. Thus, when federal urban renewal legislation 
was passed and concentrated in areas of close proximity to the aging downtown area, Black 
community members were disproportionately affected. The creation, and subsequent destruction, 
of Black neighborhoods was not based on decisions of the Black people who resided there, but 
rather were shaped by white ideologies contained in the foundation of housing related issues.  
Central to Black housing in Milwaukee is the concept of urbicide, or the deliberate death 
of the city. The portions of Milwaukee that were targeted for urban renewal projects were 
considered as areas of heightened blight without truly investigating the assets that each area may 
have contained. The general public began to accept the idea that blight was undesirable and 
needed to be removed as quickly as possible. Therefore, Black neighborhoods became targets for 
demolition just as much as the people that resided in them. Large construction projects that 
consumed square blocks erased the histories of the demolished buildings themselves, but also the 
histories of the people who settled and lived there. This deliberate destruction of physical 
structures lends itself directly to a discussion of the deliberate destruction of history, especially 
the history of Black inhabitants. Omitting low-income housing from the conversation, urban 
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renewal projects were seemingly met with little resistance, as they generally did not affect those 
who controlled the larger conversation, or those in power, mainly white individuals. Black 
residents were seemingly left without an influential voice and the deliberate killing of their 
neighborhoods, urbicide, continued and persistently influenced the Black sense of place in 
Milwaukee.  
Through the research conducted for Chapter One, it is clear that an extremely significant 
element is missing from the conversation regarding the Black urban experience in Milwaukee: 
the histories and personal experiences of Black residents. Excluding these voices, histories, and 
narratives from the discussion of post-WWII Milwaukee and the city’s urban renewal projects 
only adds to the popular perception that Black residents were inactive in matters that directly 
affected their environments. It also continues to perpetuate the ideology that Black community 
members did not care about their residences and neighborhoods. Even though much of the 
current literature continues to disseminate this information by also excluding the experiences of 
the Black resident, this thesis seeks to bring the narrative of Milwaukee’s Black population to the 
forefront and disprove much of the discussion included in urban renewal literature portraying 
Black residents as idle. I will do this by analyzing Milwaukee’s Walnut Street area from its 
creation through the early 1980s.  
Chapter Two focuses heavily on the creation of the vicinity known as Bronzeville and 
attempts to give testament to sense of community pride contained within its borders. Although 
this neighborhood was created through the forceful manipulation of Black bodies, it came to 
represent something much larger. It signified the solidified creation of a Black sense of place in 
the City of Milwaukee, a place where Black residents felt that they truly belonged. Bronzeville 
residents were able to open their own businesses, become members of Black community 
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organizations, and create a neighborhood identity of their own. Unfortunately, this community 
was literally torn in two by the construction of Milwaukee’s interstate highway. Little regard was 
given to the area, including the businesses and homes that were located there, or the Black bodies 
that resided and conducted business there. 
Chapter Three will continue to dispel widespread views about the Black community by 
emphasizing the local activism undertaken by those who remained after Bronzeville was torn 
apart. This activism will be highlighted using a discussion of the community organization named 
the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO. WAICO leaders engaged with local 
community members to reestablish a Black sense of place in a modified area and to support the 
needs of individual residents. Although additional proposed urban renewal projects threatened to 
displace even more of the area’s residents, WAICO fought against these initiatives to maintain 
their place in Milwaukee as well as prove that Black residents had a voice, an opinion, and a 
strong backing. As the support for WAICO projects increased, the organization took on the 
creation of local low-income housing for residents that had been displaced by the continued 
presence of bulldozers and groups determined to rid the city of blight and dilapidated structures. 
While WAICO hit major roadblocks in their quest to create as many alternative housing options 
for Black residents as they hoped, they were successful in producing a large number of units for 
displaced community members.  
It is through the exploration of these highly active communities surrounding Walnut 
Street, both before and after Milwaukee’s interstate highway decimated their neighborhoods, that 
a more complete history of the city’s Black residents can be uncovered and put into the contexts 
in which they belong. This will guide and contribute to research that is still being conducted 
regarding the Black urban experience in the years leading up to and surrounding urban renewal 
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projects throughout the United States by shining the light on a primarily Black neighborhood that 
took matters into their own hands to directly influence their environment.  
The combination of Chapters Two and Three also bring an important feature to the 
conversation regarding the Black urban experience: place matters. In terms of grassroots and 
community led activism, the specific location, or place, in which these types of organizing occur 
can have a significant impact on the success or failure of the effort. For example, if a group of 
individuals attempt to create an organization based around community involvement in a place 
where neighbors are far spread and the has been no history of community activism, that 
particular group of people will have an extremely difficult time finding success. On the other 
hand, if the groundwork has been laid for active community participation over several years and 
community members are familiar with one another’s wants, needs, and desires, that same group 
of people has a higher chance of becoming successful in their attempts. Thus, it can be said that 
place has meaning and that place directly affects the type of organization that can be created as 
well as the interventions and the strategies that can be effectively employed within the 
organization.   
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Chapter Two 
Walnut Street: Milwaukee’s Bronzeville 
 
 While Chapter One discusses the structural and societal forces that Black residents were 
confronted with during the years in which they chose to settle in the City of Milwaukee, and 
throughout the United States, the available research does not express the entire history of the 
Black urban experience. Uncovering and explaining the structural and societal influences merely 
allows the reader to grasp the full power and extent of pressure that outside voices had over 
environments that they, themselves, did not inhabit. Although many scholars stop at this initial 
uncovering of material, this is problematic because facts, figures, and accounts that are already 
available do not tell the entire story. The exploration of the environments that Black residents 
inhabited and the inclusion of personal accounts and descriptions are crucial to the conversation. 
These additional pieces of information help not only scholars, but the general public as well, 
understand the entirety of the Black urban experience and begins to uncover evidence used to 
dispel popular views of Black residents as indifferent to environmental changes and idle when 
changes taking place negatively affected them. 
To uncover a large piece of Milwaukee’s urban experience from the perspective of its 
Black population, one must look at the space in which three-fourths of the city’s Black 
population resided in, Bronzeville.136 The general term “Bronzeville” is often used to describe 
areas in Northern cities that are segregated into sectors of color bounded by customs and laws.137 
Sociologist Horace R. Cayton explains that the use of the term “bronze” to refer to skin color 
was preferred by many Black people due to the negative connotations linked to the terms 
                                                           
136 Paul H. Geenen, Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, 1900-1950, (Chicago: Arcadia Publishing, 2006), 7. 
137 Genevieve G. McBride and Stephen R. Byers, “The First Mayor of Black Milwaukee: J. Anthony Josey,” The 
Wisconsin Magazine of History, 91(2) 2008, 2. 
  
48 
“Negro” and “Black.” In addition, by using the neighborhood name “Bronzeville,” Black 
residents hoped to remove some of the stigmas that went along being designated a “Black 
neighborhood.”138 
 Like many other United States cities that boasted their own Bronzeville, Milwaukee’s 
Bronzeville grew quickly. In 1930, Highland Boulevard, Walnut Street, Third Street, and 
Twelfth Street bound Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, all of which were designated as a fourth (D) 
grade or as undeveloped on HOLC139 maps. By 1960, the area expanded north to Keefe Avenue, 
east to the Milwaukee River, and west to Twenty-First Street.140 As the area encompassed by the 
term “Bronzeville” increased, the amount of structures contained in the area increased as well. 
On HOLC maps, these additional homes and buildings contained only a third (C) or fourth grade, 
designation. Figure 5 illustrates the expansion and movement of the Bronzeville community 
from 1905 through the 1940s.  
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Figure 5: Map of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, 1905-1940s. 
Source: Genevieve G. McBride and Stephen R. Byers, 
“The First Mayor of Black Milwaukee: J. Anthony Josey,” 
The Wisconsin Magazine of History, 91(2) 2008, 2. 
 
Though the creation of Bronzeville was heavily influenced by those in power through 
legal regulations and targeted discourse, Black people residing in this area created their own 
sense of place and community within their controlled borders. As Katherine McKittrick suggests, 
Black geographies can be said to be connected to “practices of domination” that “shape, but do 
  
50 
not wholly define, [B]lack worlds.”141 Instead, in many cases, Black residents took these 
practices of domination and created a sense of place in their confined spaces within the city. 
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville was a prime example. 
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville was compromised of Black owned and run businesses, 
entertainment venues, churches, social service agencies, and social clubs, many of which lined 
its main road, Walnut Street.142 Neighborhood businesses allowed for local commerce and 
employment opportunities while aiding in the creation of an environment that allowed for close 
social relationships, community support, and shared resources. Bronzeville became a lively, 
flourishing hub for collaboration, communication, and community even though race and 
discrimination continued to play a factor in the lives of Black residents.  
By exploring the Black sense of place that Black Milwaukeeans created in Bronzeville, a 
small piece of their culture and history can be promoted and reinforced in contrast to the many 
instances of the erasure of Black history. The assets of the Bronzeville community and the 
people that compromised the area’s population refute the views that Black people lacked a sense 
of pride in the spaces that they inhabited and, thus, these views can be largely dismissed within 
the City of Milwaukee. This particular exploration of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville opens the door 
for additional research into the Black urban experience in cities throughout the United States. It 
is the hope of this researcher that this project will promote the exploration of the Black urban 
experience in additional sectors of Milwaukee’s economy and city limits over a larger period of 
time. Not only will this promote the Black urban experience of the past to be revisited, but it will 
also encourage researchers to look at the ongoing urban experience from the perspective of those 
who are directly affected by the urban environment. 
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Creating Community: Laying the Foundation for a Black Sense of Place 
To accommodate the ever-increasing Black population during the periods of the Great 
Migration, churches became the cornerstone of survival for many Black individuals and families. 
St. Mark African Methodist Episcopal Church, Calvary Baptist, St. Benedict the Moor Mission 
and School, the Church of God in Christ, and the Greater Galilee Baptist Church served Black 
people in the Bronzeville area by addressing spiritual, social, and economic needs. Places of 
worship provided opportunities for socialization and aided in the establishment of schools, 
employment agencies, and social welfare groups.143 In one account of the role of the church in 
resident’s lives, a congregant of the Church of God recalled her mother, the minister’s wife, 
“…help[ing] many people, those that had no homes to live in, those that had no food, those that 
had no clothes. She went around the street gathering up wayward children… [Our] home was 
always open to all strangers.”144 Not only was this type of social service instrumental in bringing 
bodies into the church, these services helped keep families afloat, especially newly arrived 
individuals and families from Southern states. 
 Churches represented more than just a spiritual meeting ground. They served as a place 
where Black culture and Black community could grow and offered a safe place for Black people 
to discuss issues present in their everyday lives. Before and after services, church congregations 
gathered together and exchanged information, shared resources, and provided support for one 
another “sort of like a beehive” oftentimes “without even asking for it.”145 In some 
circumstances, as discussed in Osofsky’s exploration of Harlem, churches also played a role in 
the development of the physical environment. Churches often invested heavily in local real 
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estate, either buying structures to conduct their services in or to house Black residents having 
difficulty finding other housing options. Unlike Black individuals, Black churches could not be 
barred from purchasing property covered by restrictive housing covenants. Thus, churches 
became a vector through which Black residents were able to gain access to certain sections of the 
city that they would normally have been banned from living in.146 Churches became a main 
staple in the Bronzeville community in each of these ways and continued to provide support for 
residents as the borders continued to grow.  
Not surprisingly, the vast needs of community members put a large amount of pressure 
on churches, parishioners, and ministers. To aid in dispersing the burden, all-Black social clubs, 
such as Les Belles Femmes, the Top Hat Club, and the Variety Boys, were formed. These social 
clubs held fundraisers and events to raise money for various endeavors, including supplying 
families in need with the funds to purchase possessions for their homes or to support their 
livelihoods after losing a loved one.147  The number of these clubs rose rapidly and by 1953, 
there were eighty-seven social clubs listed in the Negro Business Directory.148 Both the church 
and social clubs served to promote the needs of the Bronzeville community through providing 
basic needs for area residents, but they also became organizations that helped Black residents 
realize that a better life was attainable through community cohesion.  
The sense of community and support created through congregations and social clubs 
trickled down to other parts of the Bronzeville neighborhood. Black owned businesses began to 
pop up, especially along the area’s main thoroughfare, Walnut Street. Entertainment became the 
core of what Bronzeville was known for. During the 1940s, Jazz and Blues clubs were plenty and 
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served as a channel for Black self-expression. Many called this area “Milwaukee’s Harlem” due 
to the popularity of entertainment options, especially Blues and Jazz music venues.149 Record 
stores, such as The Bop Shop (612 W. Walnut St.) and Harlem Records (919 W. Walnut St.), 
served as meeting grounds for music lovers, both Black and white. Live entertainment at taverns, 
such as the Rose Room (604 W. Walnut St.), Savoy (710 W. Walnut St.), 700 Tap (700 W. 
Walnut St.), and Jon and Lou’s (823 W. Walnut St.), showcased this music up-close and 
personal.150 Milwaukee attracted nationally known performers like Count Basie, Dizzy Gillespie, 
Nat “King” Cole, Louis Armstrong, and Duke Ellington.151 As in cities across the nation, these 
Black performers were not able to stay in white-run hotels and often ended up staying at the 
homes of Bronzeville residents or above the taverns and venues that they played at.152 
A neighborhood staple, the Regal Theater (704 W. Walnut St.), formerly known as the 
Rose Theater, became much more than a place to see movies. In 1938 Prominent Black lawyer 
James W. Dorsey remodeled the theater and began showing films with all Black casts. 153  By 
1950, the theater was sold to Sidney Margoles who increased the theater’s film selections to 
include westerns and cartoons, drawing in Black families for triple features.154 The theater was 
rented out for social events, civil talks, and educational purposes. In the early 1950s, Black track 
star, Jesse Owens, visited the Regal Theater to speak with local Black youth. Amateur nights 
were initiated for local acts and the Regal became a venue for local teenagers to learn the art of 
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jitterbugging, a popular form of swing dancing. 155 Margoles also hired local teenagers to work as 
clerks, ushers, and cashiers.156 
The successes of these entertainment venues paved the way for other Bronzeville 
businesses to open their doors. Many restaurants, lounges, and drive-ins opened along Walnut 
Street, seeing large spikes in business when accommodating the after-hours crowds.157 Some of 
the restaurants that lined Walnut Street included Tompkins Ice Cream Parlor (816 W. Walnut 
St.), Deacon Jones Chicken Shack (537 W. Walnut St.), Clara’s Restaurant (722 W. Walnut St.), 
and Boatner’s Chili (709 W. Walnut Street). Other businesses, such as real estate agencies 
(Johnson Agency – 921 W. Walnut St.), barbershops (Deluxe Barber Shop – 939 W. Walnut St.), 
law firms (Theodore Coggs, Attorney at Law – 635A. W. Walnut St.), clothing stores (Bentley’s 
Clothing and Jewelry – 1138 W. Walnut St.), grocery stores (Silverstein Grocery Store – 732 W. 
Walnut St.), laundromats (T. Joe’s Self Service Launderette – 718 W. Walnut St.), and mechanic 
shops (Jones Service Station – 603 W. Walnut St.), dotted Walnut Street during Bronzeville’s 
prime.158 In the 1950-1951 edition of the Negro Business Guide to the State of Wisconsin, thirty-
five taverns, twenty-seven restaurants, fifteen beauty shops, twelve barbershops, twelve grocery 
stores, eleven auto repair shops, five laundromats, and eight attorney locations were found to be 
owned and run by Black individuals and families throughout the City of Milwaukee, many of 
which were located in Bronzeville.159 
                                                           
155 Ibid., 36. 
156 Ibid., 54-55. 
157 Luhrssen, “Walnut Street Rhythm,” 34. 
158 Luhrssen, “Walnut Street Rhythm,” 33. & Ivory Abena Black, Bronzeville: A Milwaukee Lifestyle, (Washington 
DC: The Publishers Groups, LLC, 2005), “In honor of…” page at front of book. 
159 Mary Ellen Shadd, Negro Business Directory of the State of Wisconsin, 1950-1951, Published by Mary Ellen 
Shadd, Milwaukee, WI, 1951, 45-97. 
  
55 
Though many of the businesses contained in Bronzeville were owned and operated by 
Black residents in the 1940s (109) and 1950s (210), Jewish-run establishments still existed.160 
The difficulties Black residents faced when attempting to coexist with other white populations 
did not exist to the same extent with area Jewish business owners. They willingly hired Black 
employees in their delis, fish markets, and drugstores.161 The patronage at Black and white 
owned establishments crossed color lines and these venues served as a place where skin color 
seemingly did not matter.  
Applying and acquiring the licenses for businesses in the area did not follow this same 
trajectory. In comparison to their white counterparts, Black occupants who desired to open their 
own businesses often had to jump through additional hoops to acquire business loans and 
licenses.162 In some instances, white businessmen approached Black businesses that were having 
difficulty obtaining licenses with proposals to provide a front to obtain licenses and would split 
the profits. One such example was Dason’s Tavern on Fifth Street and Center Street. Owner 
Arary Charles was having difficulty receiving a liquor license even though his establishment was 
ready to open its doors. Ronald Silverman, a Jewish businessman looking to get into the tavern 
business, heard of Charles’ troubles. Silverman approached Charles and his wife with a proposal 
of Silverman taking over the management of Dason’s and Charles remaining the owner of the 
establishment. This front for Dason’s liquor license proved successful and the tavern’s doors 
opened in 1951.163  
In the instances where white partners did not approach Black businessmen, other ways of 
financing a business needed to be utilized. Black social clubs often put up the money for venues 
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to open for business and continued to support them by hosting special events, charging members 
of other social organizations for tickets, and providing compensation for national and local acts 
out of their own pockets.164 Amusement companies also provided the means for businesses to 
receive small loans.  These companies would provide businesses with a small amount of money 
in addition to in-house entertainment, such as jukeboxes and pool tables, under contracts that 
lasted anywhere from three to ten years. A percentage of the revenue generated by these types of 
in-house entertainment was appropriated to the amusement companies, often at high rates. 
However high these rates were, in the face of relegated economic prospects, they offered a way 
for businessmen and women in Bronzeville to keep their doors open.165 Sometimes these 
revenues were also used for charitable purposes, helping out organizations or individuals in their 
time of need.166 Other times, less than legal activities were used to finance daily operations. 
 While gambling, bootlegging, and prostitution were prevalent in Bronzeville, policy 
games were the most frequent forms of “vice” found in the area. In these games, players picked 
any amount of numbers between one and seventy-eight with the chance to win more money the 
more numbers you picked and got correct. The winning policy numbers were picked each day 
from as far away as Covington, Kentucky, and were wired to Milwaukee for final payouts.167 In 
1948, the Milwaukee Journal found that there were approximately eleven illegal “wheels” 
operating within the city, generating over $1 million annually.168 The Milwaukee Journal and the 
Milwaukee Sentinel estimated between 150 and 200 men were employed as wheel operators, 
pickup men, counters, checkers, writers, and runners for Milwaukee’s policy gaming, with 5 
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percent of the city’s population accounting for over 50 percent of the gambling that occurred 
within its limits.169 Not only did policy games offer a source of employment for local residents, 
but they also helped Black owned businesses gain startup capital by hosting these types of 
amusements and receiving a certain percentage cut of the revenues.  
 Over time, these illegal activities became an economic and social institution in the 
neighborhood. Although both rich and poor and Black and white individuals utilized the 
institution of wagering, it began to take on its own stereotypes depending on what type of 
wagering participants were involved in. White people were seen to engage in clean and 
respectable types of betting, such as horse racing, while Black people were seen as those who 
engaged in the dirty, lazy forms of gambling, such as policy games. These stereotypes reinforced 
the racial divide and brought about an increased police presence in Black communities 
throughout the United States to put a stop to this dishonorable form of gambling.170 Although 
this forced policy games further and further underground, they remained an integral part of the 
Bronzeville community. 
In the latter years of Bronzeville’s existence, locally based Columbia Savings and Loan, a 
Black owned and operated banking institution, offered Black business owners additional 
financial backing. Keeping financial resources within the Bronzeville community allowed Black 
businesses to thrive and made it possible for business owners to make a decent living without 
running the risk of meeting racial discrimination in terms of financing.171  
Black owned businesses were opened and supported by many hours of overtime worked 
by Black men and women. The establishment of community businesses represented the 
philosophy that many Black migrants brought with them on their journey North, a “pull yourself 
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up by the bootstraps” ethos.172 Hard work was not snubbed in Milwaukee’s Black community 
and was often a characteristic passed on to younger generations. The children of businessmen 
and women worked at their family’s establishments after school and on the weekends. Business 
owners who did not have children or other family members in the area hired local teens and area 
residents to fill the empty roles at their establishments. During and immediately following the 
Great Depression, this internal hiring practice became more and more crucial. By 1940, “51 
percent of [Black] men were unemployed, with 29 percent of them actively looking for work.”173 
By hiring employees from the immediate neighborhood, financial resources were maintained 
locally, social ties were strengthened, and community cohesion increased. 
In addition to providing job opportunities, the larger community engaged area youth in 
the direct environment to keep them out of trouble and to provide them with an opportunity to 
connect with their emerging sense of self. As stated earlier, youth artists were invited to perform 
at the Regal Theater for small community events, as well as larger social gatherings. Local high 
school student musicians were often invited to showcase their talents at area jazz clubs and were 
mentored by Leonard Gay, Jimmy Dudley, and Bert Bailey, native jazz and blues musicians who 
had gained notoriety on city, state, and national scales.174 The MUL put together sporting events 
to provide Black youth with positive role models. Professional boxer, Baby Joe Gans, was 
brought to Milwaukee’s Bronzeville to train Black youth who were interested in boxing. Ethel 
Brunner, the first Black employee at Lapham Park Social Center, taught Bronzeville girls 
modeling and dancing and created a program to teach girls how to play baseball.175 The 
Northside Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) at Sixth Street and North Avenue was 
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constructed in the late 1950s to provide a space for youth and adults to occupy themselves in 
positive ways, such as field trips, after school and evening classes, and social activities.176 
Leaders in the community looked to these types of activities to bring youth together and to teach 
them skills to create a better life for themselves and for their families. 
Suitable educational opportunities were also important to local residents and families. 
Adolescents attended one of ten area schools: Fourth Street, Siefert, Lloyd Street, St. Francis, 
Ninth Street, Roosevelt Junior High, St. Benedict the Moor, Lincoln High, North Division High, 
or Girls Tech.177 All of these schools, with the exception of Siefert and St. Francis, 
predominately served Black students. Because of the hypersegregation of Milwaukee, even 
though federal school desegregation was mandated through 1954’s Brown vs. Board of 
Education, Bronzeville schools remained 90 percent Black by 1960.178 The ethos of hard work 
followed Black students into the realm of education. Students seeking higher instruction attended 
Milwaukee Technical School at night while working during the day, which was typical of area 
high school students as well.179  
To solidify themselves as an entity with their own set of customs and regulations, 
Bronzeville residents unofficially elected their own mayor, J. Anthony Josey, in 1945.180 
Although not officially recognized by local or federal government, Josey served as the “official 
‘greeter’ for the district, leader of social affairs, unofficial spokesman of the [Black] population, 
and ‘friend in need’ to any and all of his constituents.”181 Josey was instrumental in Bronzeville’s 
participation at the polls and fought against the negative portrayal of Milwaukee’s Black 
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population in the Milwaukee Journal. He solidified a public apology from the local publication 
for their racially biased news judgment, including revealing of the race of criminals only when 
the criminal happened to be Black.182 Josey also promoted patronage at local Black owned 
businesses and believed that having neighborhood businesses that employed local community 
members was a way in which the Black community could develop “powerful institutions” that 
would represent a “long step in the solution” to the problem of racial inequality.183 J. Anthony 
Josey became a real estate agent to adequately represent and advocate for potential Black 
homeowners. He also served as a mentor to Bronzeville’s youth as an advisor to an all-boy’s 
baseball team and spearheaded additional activities for youth groups at the Northside YMCA.184 
Josey’s commitment to Milwaukee’s Bronzeville was unwavering. 
While he pushed for community progress, particularly political and economic strides, J. 
Anthony Josey was largely against instances of intentional racial separation. Assigning Black 
social workers, nurses, and probation officers to Black clientele and the creation of the MUL’s 
all-Black social center were steps in the wrong direction in Josey’s mind. In addition, as Black 
voters shifted from the support of Republican candidates to the support of Democratic 
candidates, Josey stood fast as a faithful Republican, even as Republican candidates became 
progressively conservative.185 Despite Josey’s seemingly contradictory stances when compared 
to the larger Black population, Bronzeville residents stood behind him and hailed him a 
champion of Black causes until his death in July of 1957.186  
Bronzeville’s physical environment reflected the pride that community members began to 
feel as housing options and economic prospects were strengthened. Streets and sidewalks were 
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free of clutter and the frequency of street crimes was low.187 Green spaces were utilized for 
community picnics and get-togethers to keep the community strong.188 Relationships with the 
police force were generally positive with many active officers frequenting local businesses and 
nightclubs both during and after their shifts.189 
 Each of these pieces of the Bronzeville community contributed to the creation of a center 
for Black culture, but they also allowed for a community to develop economically and socially. 
Because of the discrimination that Black residents continually faced, they understood that in 
order to survive they would need to band together to push one another up instead of drag one 
another down. Neighbors in this area were close, so close “that if a kid did something naughty on 
one end of the block, his parents would already know about it by the time he got home.”190 Many 
residents were able to sleep and go to work without locking their doors and some even slept 
outside when the weather was too hot.191 Residents looked to one another for aid in raising 
children, finding employment opportunities, borrowing money for bills or car repairs, and for 
help when a member of the family had fallen ill. Community became more than neighbors, 
community became family.192 Though the majority of Milwaukee’s white population saw 
Bronzeville as a successful containment of the Black community, others saw the area as a space 
for budding opportunity and the creation of a solidified sense of place. This feeling, however, 
would not last. 
  
The End of the Line 
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Urban renewal and redevelopment projects of the 1950s and 1960s quickly expanded to 
include major parts of the sizeable area that Bronzeville now comprised. Most notably, the 
continued growth of the I-43 expressway, the use of eminent domain practices, changes in city 
codes, and continued designation of blight threatened the homes, businesses, and community that 
area residents worked so hard to create. While the total number of Bronzeville homes and 
businesses destroyed for the construction of the expressway is unknown, by visualizing the total 
amount of space needed for a six-lane roadway, exits and on-ramps, and construction materials 
and machines for the over twenty-five blocks of Bronzeville, one can begin to grasp the enormity 
of the devastation.  
In addition to initial freeway plans, the construction of the Hillside Housing Project, one 
low-rent housing development, was undertaken in 1948 on the south side of Walnut Street. 
Bounded by Sixth Street, Ninth Street, Galena Street, and Vliet Street, this project was 
completed by 1955.193  However, what started off as a one-building housing project grew into a 
full-blown redevelopment project by 1957. The main objective of the Hillside Redevelopment 
Project was to demolish dilapidated and substandard buildings in the area, like many other urban 
renewal projects plans. What makes this particular project worth noting is that this development 
was located in the middle of the Black business district. This region of Bronzeville contained 
ninety-nine businesses, over 47 percent of the total number of Black owned businesses in the 
area. While business owners were given control over the sale of their businesses and the land 
they were built on, if they could not find a buyer in the allotted amount of time, the city would 
take their properties through the use of eminent domain.194 
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In addition to businesses, 414 families and 126 boarders, of which 98 percent were Black, 
were displaced through the demolition of the structures deemed unfit for inhabitation.195 Many of 
these displaced residents were, in fact, eligible to become inhabitants in the Hillside low-rent 
housing development, but were pushed out due to the 318 returning veterans and reunited 
families, many of whom were white, competing for 222 housing units.196 This overcrowding and 
competition led many displaced Black families to leave the community they knew and loved to 
seek housing, employment, and business opportunities elsewhere.  
Only a small fraction of those Black residents displaced chose to live in housing projects 
constructed through urban renewal plans. These housing projects, such as Seaway Terrace, 
located at 4601 South First Street, well to the south of Bronzeville, and Zander Terrance, located 
near Green Tree Road and Teutonia Avenue, well to the north of Bronzeville, were situated in 
unfamiliar areas and inhabited by unfamiliar people. Seaway Terrace contained only four 
residents from the Bronzeville area while Zander Terrace contained only six.197 
To attract displaced residents to other housing options located throughout the city, 
Milwaukee’s Housing Authority sent advertisements and invitations to dislocated inhabitants, 
but received little to no response.198 Citing a 1960 collaborative study between the MUL and the 
University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Wesley Scott, MUL representative, stated that displaced 
Black residents were often willing to relocate to other parts of the city, but were only willing to 
do so if they were guaranteed social acceptance.199 At this particular time in history, as in 
decades past, social acceptance could never be guaranteed. 
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In 1959, Milwaukee’s Land Commission Chief Researcher, Robert Ducharme, stated that 
most of the residents displaced by urban renewal efforts continued to live within a two-mile 
radius of their original residences.200 Milwaukee’s Housing Authority and Department of City 
Development suggested that, “…people from the center of the city don’t want to move to the 
extremes of the city…” and would rather not face the unknown of a new area and the potential 
for continued racial discrimination.201 Thus, overcrowding in remaining area homes became 
increasingly prevalent, further exacerbating the housing crisis in Bronzeville and in the Black 
community as a whole. 
By 1966, compensation for displaced homeowners and business owners was increased to 
include the market value of the property, moving expenses, personal property losses, and 
additional incidentals. While this may have seemed like a step in the right direction by the 
government, there was no entity put in place to aid these displaced homeowners and businesses 
in finding alternative locations to relocate. In addition, this new regulation did not compensate 
displaced residents who were renting their homes.202  
Aldermen George Whittow and Clarence Miller suggested another approach to housing 
displaced residents in 1966. In their approach, instead of constructing new structures for 
displaced families to live in, the city would buy existing vacant homes in the inner core and rent 
them to individuals and families who had been displaced. When the amount of rent an individual 
or a family paid equaled the purchase price of the home, the home would then be donated to the 
resident or residents. However, due to continued freeway expansion, the housing stock of the 
inner city continued to dwindle and this plan never came to fruition.203 
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Instead, Black residents who had been displaced were left to utilize whatever resources 
they could find. As stated above, this often led to overcrowding in the homes that still existed in 
the area. It also led to an increase in the prevalence of the characteristics assigned to the term 
blight discussed in Chapter One: the age of buildings, population gain and loss, structural 
deterioration, and declines in certain health indicators. The continued prevalence of these 
characteristics in the central city designated them as disposable areas along with the people that 
inhabited them. Little regard was given to the Black people who were being displaced.   
  
Urban Renewal as the Destruction of a Black Sense of Place and Root Shock 
Not only does this description of Bronzeville serve as an example of the erasure of the 
Black sense of place, it also serves as one of the many examples of urban renewal projects 
creating root shock. As Katherine McKittrick suggests, Black communities are configured 
spatially to reflect “practices of domination and deliberate attempts to destroy a Black sense of 
place.”204 The individuals and groups that bought property, practiced eminent domain, and made 
the plans for urban renewal projects and the construction and expansion of the freeway did so 
without thinking much about the businesses and families that would be affected by the 
demolition required for these projects. When an outcry was heard from the general public, those 
in power dismissed accusations as trivial in comparison to the great amount of good urban 
renewal projects would bring to the City of Milwaukee. Additionally, it can be said that perhaps 
those in power were threatened by the sense of culture and community support that was present 
in the Bronzeville area. Black residents were conducting a majority of their monetary 
interactions amongst themselves, a Black Alderwoman was elected to office, the area had its own 
“mayor,” neighbors relied on one another for emotional and monetary support, schools were 
                                                           
204 McKittrick,” On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place,” 947.  
  
66 
centrally located and made up of community members, and social clubs and organizations were 
formed and provided a foundational support for the community as a whole. It is conceivable, 
then, that other communities, largely the white community, saw Bronzeville as a threat to their 
continued domination and sought to legally destroy it through urban renewal projects and the 
placement of the I-43 expressway.  
This occurrence follows McKittrick’s argument and lends itself to a discussion of 
urbicide, or the “deliberate death of the city and willful place annihilation.”205 By forcing Black 
residents into the spaces that made up Bronzeville and then destroying those places years later, it 
can be said those in power put the act of urbicide into action. It is no coincidence that the 
freeway was constructed through a vibrant Black community. It is no coincidence that several 
Milwaukee landmarks are currently situated in areas that once contained Black residents. These 
roadways and landmarks were deliberately placed in these areas by deeming them slums and 
finding blight through the creation of fluid manifestations of what blight was. By allowing for 
this fluidity in term, blight took on a wide variety of meanings and encompassed a wide variety 
of structures and, at the same time, people. This blight was found in deliberate areas, setting up 
an environment for “willful place annihilation” and the destruction of the Black sense of place 
that had been created there. 
Mindy Thompson Fullilove looks at the destruction of the Black sense of place and 
urbicide from another light. She uses the term root shock to describe the emotional upheaval that 
urban renewal projects caused within those whose sense of place was destroyed. Fullilove 
explores this root shock on the individual level and the community level. Within the individual, 
root shock has negative effects on trust, relationships, social, emotional, and financial resources, 
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and personal health and anxiety levels.206 While there are relatively few personal accounts of 
Bronzeville’s root shock on the individual level in recorded history, the sheer number of Black 
people displaced can attest to the negative effects of root shock that Fullilove describes.  
At the community level, Fullilove’s description of root shock includes the physical 
destruction of neighborhoods and the emotional bonds that are created in neighborhood settings. 
Through the exploration of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, this community’s root shock is not hard to 
see. The I-43 expressway cut Bronzeville almost perfectly in half, cutting off one side of the 
neighborhood from the other and destroying everything in between. The business thoroughfare, 
Walnut Street, did not escape this community incision. Because residents were unable to cross 
six lanes of traffic to get to either side of the expressway for their needs, both emotional and 
tangible, relationships, businesses, and livelihood suffered. The continued demolition of homes 
and businesses in the area exacerbated these effects and Bronzeville, as a whole, would never 
exist again. Fullilove fully anticipates this ongoing effect of root shock stating that entire 
societies and future generations will be affected by this upheaval.207 Although pieces of 
Milwaukee’s Bronzeville still exist, along with the name itself, the area has not been able to 
recreate the prosperity and sense of community cohesion that it once had in the immense amount 
of space that the area encompassed.   
What Chapter Two also highlights is the importance of institutions in the creation, 
maintenance, and destruction of an urban community. Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, for example, 
was influenced by many different institutions that shaped the history of its existence. 
Bronzeville’s social institutions, such as families, the community, churches, social clubs, and 
businesses, regulated acceptable behaviors of area citizens and created a set of expectations for 
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individuals. These institutions banded together to ensure that area residents were granted basic 
living necessities by providing support, guidance, resources, and employment opportunities to 
positively encourage and assist the environment they were a part of.  
Other institutions, such as governmental entities and certain media outlets, were 
instrumental in the destruction of Bronzeville. In partnership with the media, governmental 
bodies were able to portray Bronzeville as an area with a large amount of blight and hardship to 
garner support for the massive amount of demolition that occurred in the neighborhood. These 
institutions were able to manipulate the narrative of the Bronzeville community in conjunction 
with the narrative of the City of Milwaukee to create a conversation that supported their end goal 
of bringing a tax base back to the central city. At the same time, this narrative masked the reality 
that urban renewal projects were successfully and diligently destroying a vibrant, cohesive 
community and displacing thousands of local residents. Governmental institutions then often 
denied responsibility for locating or creating alternative housing options for these displaced 
residents. When these institutions did take action to create housing, the location of these options 
were highly controlled and heavily influenced by social institutions far removed from the 
Bronzeville community, in this case, the city’s white population. The exploration of these 
different types of institutions in various contexts can add to urban histories and the historical 
scholarship of cities in a way that helps to uncover the interplay between institutions and how 
certain institutions became more valued and influential than others.  
In the case of Milwaukee’s Bronzeville, the social institutions of family, community, 
churches, social clubs, and businesses are often left out of the conversation of the Black urban 
experience. In particular, the creation of grassroots and community led organizations as 
institutions within the Black community during the time of urban renewal has been 
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predominately ignored. Milwaukee’s Black community did not let the physical destruction of 
their space become the blueprint for their cultural and community destruction. The late 1960s 
marked a pivotal moment in the Black community - a movement towards the integration of 
grassroots and community led movements as social institutions. The community members 
involved in this movement were committed to the revitalization and redevelopment of Black 
neighborhoods and sought to emphasize the voices of those who had been displaced by urban 
renewal.  
Chapter Three discusses the actions of a community led organization, the Walnut Area 
Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO, in working to change the perception of the “slice” of 
Bronzeville that this particular group of inhabited and represented. Chapter Three focuses on the 
evolution of WAICO from a five-member group to a full-blown community organization that 
attracted the support of other Milwaukee organizations, businesses, leaders, and members of the 
general public. Initially focused on preventing bulldozers from demolishing an ever-depleting 
housing stock through the physical improvement of their neighborhoods, WAICO quickly 
become a large player in the area’s housing market. Through these actions, WAICO sought to 
become a voice for area residents, to fight against negative social perceptions of Black residents, 
and to fight for their sense of place in a changing city.  
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Chapter Three 
From Root Shock to Community Collaboration:  
Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc. 
 
 Due to federal urban renewal legislation and local manifestations of this revitalization 
and redevelopment movement, many of Milwaukee’s Black residents, both individuals and entire 
families, were uprooted and forced to define a new sense of place within a city they had 
inhabited for years. The construction of the I-43 expressway decimated the existing community 
of Bronzeville that housed three-fourths of Milwaukee’s Black population. These residents spent 
the better half of the early 1900s creating a thriving and united community in which they 
increasingly took pride. However, with the appearance of urban renewal projects, this 
community was split into smaller groups in pockets of the city. While some Black residents were 
able to stay in their homes and continue to run businesses, they were cut off from the larger 
Black community that they had worked for many years to create. This fission of Black kinship 
no doubt had an effect on Black Milwaukeean’s sense of place and led to many of the 
characteristics of root shock described in Chapters One and Two. Even though the considerable 
destruction of the Black community had these extensive negative effects, the pockets of Black 
residents that were created did not sit idle. Instead, Black residents looked to one another for 
support and made the decision to work together to preserve the remaining areas of their 
community and to prevent further demolition and subsequent displacement. One such instance of 
this continued community cohesion is demonstrated through the creation of the Walnut Area 
Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO.  
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 Located on the west side of the I-43 expressway construction project, the newly deemed 
“Walnut Area” spanned an area of nine blocks by three blocks and included hundreds of existing 
structures. Mirroring the greater Bronzeville community, Walnut Area residents were committed 
to one another and the area in which they resided. In response to urban renewal projects that 
were threatening their area, residents came together to form WAICO. This community led 
organization focused on neighborhood development through physical improvements, such as 
garbage pickups, rat abatement, the removal of abandoned vehicles, the updating of residences, 
and the promotion of their area as a thriving community. The early successes of these types of 
initiatives spurred the growth of the organization’s mission to include the construction of new 
housing opportunities in the area. It was the hope of WAICO that displaced Bronzeville residents 
would relocate to what was left of the Walnut Street area, but also that current residents would 
remain in the area. While there were many successes in the endeavors of WAICO, there were 
many roadblocks that WAICO faced. 
 Chapter Three explores the WAICO story utilizing multiple perspectives, including 
organizational members, the organization’s two presidents, and community stakeholders, such as 
Congressman Henry S. Reuss, Milwaukee Mayor Henry W. Maier, and Willis and Lillian 
Leenhouts, local architects. This chapter will argue that the societal perception of Black residents 
as lazy, dirty, and indifferent is incorrect and unfounded as evidenced by the Walnut Area 
neighborhood. It will also argue that despite structural influences, forward progress for 
Milwaukee’s Black community was possible through the engagement of the Black community 
itself. It is through this community engagement that Walnut Area residents attempted to hold on 
to a Black sense of place and prevent additional instances of root shock within its borders. By 
  
72 
exploring WAICO and its initiatives, the history of the Black urban experience in Milwaukee can 
reach the potential of being a more comprehensive history of the time period.  
 
Establishment and Evolution: The Forward Progress of a Community Group 
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, urban renewal efforts throughout the nation 
negatively affected the Black population. This occurred through the massive displacement of 
individuals and families and the destruction of a large portion of their economic base. While 
some affected by urban renewal allowed decisions made by those in power to continually affect 
them, many Black people worked to take the preservation and revitalization of their culture and 
community back into their own hands. It is no secret that Milwaukee’s dominant Black 
community, Bronzeville, and central business hub, Walnut Street, were ripped in half by freeway 
construction and other urban renewal projects. But what is less widely known is that there was an 
early effort to sustain a sense of community and gain control over neighborhood issues. This was 
expressed through the creation of the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO.  
In advance of a formalized community organization, a small cluster of residents from the 
1800 block of North Eleventh Street banded together to form the North Eleventh Street 
Improvement Club in 1959. This club worked to clean up glass and trash from their block’s 
streets and sidewalks and engaged children by asking them to be neighborhood “sheriffs” and 
“deputies,” monitoring block activities. Two years later, the 1700 and 1900 blocks of North 
Eleventh Street joined the club and started to put pressure on the city to remove vacant and 
dilapidated homes and buildings from their blocks. By 1962, as the North Eleventh Street 
Improvement Club gained steam, they changed their name to Citizens for Progress to indicate 
that their efforts were put into place to push the community forward. In addition to a name 
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change, they expanded their club by offering woodworking and sewing classes, participating in 
MUL’s Neighbor-to-Neighbor Program, and were asked to join Mayor Henry W. Maier’s 
Citizens Participation Subcommittee.208 
In early 1965, a group of five Milwaukee residents, James Richardson, Jimmie Davidson, 
Katherine Brewster, Wesley Hutchins, and Eugene Walker, approached University of 
Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s Urban Affairs Professor, Dr. Warner Bloomberg, Jr., to provide an 
eight-week community leadership training for Citizens for Progress and other community 
leaders.209 This training was aimed at giving individuals the tools to improve the economic 
vitality and overall livelihood of their neighborhood through community self-help initiatives.210 
Following the completion of this training, these five residents, combined with the input of local 
organizations Citizens for Progress, Central City Association, St. James Methodist Church, and 
Christ Presbyterian Church, formed the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc., or WAICO, on 
April 1, 1965. WAICO’s main goal was to improve the physical appearance of the area bounded 
by Eleventh Street, Twentieth Street, Walnut Street, and Brown Street.211 In the years following 
the establishment of WAICO, the organization expanded its impact area southward to include 
Galena Street; in total, the WAICO area included nineteen square blocks and over 800 
structures.212 On Milwaukee’s HOLC maps, every block and structure contained within 
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WAICO’s designated boundaries were given a fourth (D) grade, designating the entire area as an 
extremely risky space to invest in.213 Figure 6 illustrates the boundaries of WAICO’s target area. 
 
Figure 6: WAICO Project Area Map. Source: “WAICO Project Area,” undated, Folder 26, 
Box 2, Willis and Lillian Leenhouts Architects Records, 1936-1990, University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee Archives. 
 
WAICO leaders decided that in order to be taken seriously they must establish their own 
Constitution and By-Laws. In their written Constitution, the stated purpose of WAICO is “…to 
improve the living conditions of the area in which we live, or the property, and to see that 
neighborhood problems are solved by neighborhood people.”214 Members were to be “[a]ny 
interested person who lives, or owns property, in the WAICO area, or anyone interested in 
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joining who is acceptable to the Executive Board, is eligible for membership.”215 The 
establishment of these guidelines clearly emphasized the motivation for WAICO: improving the 
lives of area residents while engaging with whomever may advance this ultimate goal. 
WAICO leaders focused the organization’s early efforts on keeping the bulldozers that 
accompanied urban renewal projects to limited spaces within their established boundaries. In an 
article in the Sunday, January 9, 1966 edition of The Milwaukee Journal, WAICO President 
Eugene P. Walker is quoted as saying, “…we (WAICO) understand that it is possible in urban 
renewal not to have to tear down everything, and only to do spot clearance.”216 To identify the 
properties that warranted demolition, community members and WAICO leaders went property-
to-property to identify area structures that were in serious need of attention. Of the 800 structures 
located in the WAICO area, most were constructed before 1920 and, by 1960, 42 percent of the 
structures considered to be residential dwellings were found to be in “dilapidated” or 
“deteriorated” condition.217 After an initial list was compiled, WAICO members came to the 
realization that many of the structures deemed dilapidated could be spared through the physical 
improvement of their exterior and interior conditions. In addition, waste management would 
need to be improved upon, abandoned cars would need to be removed, and a minimum standard 
would need to be set for the upkeep of vacant lots.218 It would be through these projects that 
WAICO could impact the decisions of city leaders and reduce the amount of blight found in their 
neighborhood. Accordingly, bulldozers and demolition tactics would be used only as a last resort 
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for the structures that could not be saved. WAICO leaders saw these initial steps as forward 
progress away from the displacement of Black residents due to urban renewal projects.  
 In order to accomplish these initial goals, WAICO leaders looked to engage area 
residents in revitalization and cleanup efforts. President Walker sent personal letters to area 
property owners stressing the importance of becoming a “united voice” in order to keep the fate 
of neighborhood homes in their hands.219 Walker urged area residents to become associate 
members of WAICO for one dollar, to become a voting member by contributing five dollars, or 
to directly contact WAICO officials.220 By doing so, the organization could hear the voices and 
opinions of the neighborhood to determine the types of improvements and developments desired 
by the people who lived there.221 WAICO also reached out to the youth of the area by involving 
them in Saturday morning trash pickups and in the promotion of the organization itself. Youth 
could be seen wearing WAICO buttons, answering questions about WAICO, and actively 
collecting garbage from area yards. 222 It was with the help of these active youth that WAICO 
began to make improvements on the physical exterior and interior structures of resident’s homes. 
By August of 1965, WAICO had either completed or had begun work on over seventy-five 
properties in the area and began advertising “WAICO AT WORK” signs to increase community 
awareness of WAICO projects.223 By directly involving residents of all ages, power and a sense 
of pride was given to the individuals who occupied the neighborhood and could feel as though 
their voice was being heard amongst the noise of the bulldozers that decimated many of the 
spaces that surrounded them. 
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In the early months of 1966, WAICO decided to more aggressively push their agenda 
with a five-point plan to conserve the WAICO area. This “Five Point Conservation Plan” 
consisted of making low-interest rate loans available for WAICO residents to improve the 
physical conditions of their properties, razing all buildings unfit for habitation, clearing and 
sodding all vacant lots in the WAICO area, helping the city plan new construction, and 
adequately lighting area streets.224 These five goals became the cornerstone of WAICO’s work 
moving forward and helped to officially form Operation Green, which aimed at sodding city-
owned vacant lots for small “pocket parks,” and Operation Remove All Trash (RAT). In order to 
reach these goals, WAICO enlisted the help of their members, but also reached out to new 
community resources, such as Volunteers In Service To America (VISTA) affiliates whom were 
workers serving as a part of President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty programming. In this 
same year, four individuals agreed to serve one year as VISTA volunteers with WAICO to fulfill 
the needs of the organization that could not be met by the Board of Directors or Executive 
Committee, all of whom were also volunteers.225  
Along with the Five Point Conservation Plan, 1966 saw WAICO focusing much of its 
effort into the positive engagement of youth and improving the well being of area occupants. 
Resident Rosella Rogers was instrumental in creating WAICO’s Young People’s Organization, 
which served over 100 young ladies by teaching manners, housekeeping, cooking, and sewing.226 
Additionally, children from the City’s Neighborhood Job Corps were given paid positions to 
work on WAICO projects. Inquiries into the welfare of area families were done by board 
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members in cases where parents or their children had not been heard from or seen over a period 
of time.227 WAICO also sought to expand their youth programming by creating a Youth 
Committee to organize dances and other activities for local teens to participate in.228 By 
engaging youth in a positive way, WAICO residents thought that they could keep them out of 
trouble and teach them skills that would last a lifetime.  
In the hopes of spreading the word of their work and goals, WAICO established a 
newsletter for members. This first newsletter, distributed in September of 1966, outlined the 
successes of Operation Green and Operation RAT, the immense amount of housing 
improvements made to structures in the area, and the direction WAICO hoped to move in the 
future.229 The distribution of WAICO’s newsletter caught the eye of Milwaukee’s 7th Ward 
Alderman and President of the Common Council, Martin E. Schreiber. Alderman Schreiber 
wrote a letter to WAICO acknowledging their “constructive” work and asked the organization to 
add additional blocks to their coverage area: from West Galena and West Brown to North 
Twentieth and North Twenty-Seventh Streets. WAICO accepted this proposal and took it as a 
challenge to continue to be an active participant in neighborhood conservation.230  
1967 saw a continued effort of WAICO to locate owners of vacant buildings and to work 
with the City of Milwaukee to either tear down these properties or establish that they be kept to a 
certain standard of upkeep.231 At this time, WAICO presented a plan to Milwaukee’s Common 
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Council in the hopes of decreasing the spread of blight into their neighborhood. This plan built 
on the already launched Five Point Conservation Plan, but added the establishment of a WAICO 
office to keep residents informed of projects and initiatives and the creation of a formalized in-
depth survey of all structures included in the area. If accepted by the Common Council, WAICO 
would be able to participate in a housing program enabling low-income families to purchase 
homes that had been rehabilitated to last a minimum of thirty years, allowing WAICO members 
to become property owners.232 While these expansions were already informally being 
implemented by WAICO, the organization hoped that by gaining the endorsement of the 
Common Council, WAICO could establish itself as a more formalized organization, allowing the 
group to access resources that had been out of reach in prior years.  
In 1967, WAICO’s Executive Committee and Board of Directors voted to become a 
nonprofit organization and to purchase a home from a local attorney for use as a formal office 
and living quarters for a needy family. Although the purchasing of this home meant significant 
on-site rehabilitation, it also meant that WAICO would be the only group in Wisconsin that had 
rehabilitated a home without any outside federal aid.233 With the help of WAICO members and 
other community organizations, the upstairs portion of the WAICO house became move-in ready 
and a significant amount of work was lined up for projects in the downstairs portion.234  
Although the organization continued to expand, WAICO’s focus on the direct community 
organizing did not waiver. Area wide jubilee celebrations and parties were hosted by various 
WAICO residents and organizations to highlight the positive impacts that the organization was 
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having on both the neighborhood and the city.235 In March of 1967, for example, WAICO’s 
Operation Green was publicly recognized and received the grand prize in Mayor Henry W. 
Maier’s Beautification Contest. As a result, Operation Green was awarded an additional 
monetary grant of $2,000 by Milwaukee’s Common Council to utilize on continued sodding 
projects.236 
Mayor Henry W. Maier became a critical component in the support of WAICO projects. 
In addition to the recognition of Operation Green, Mayor Maier attended several of WAICO’s 
progress celebrations. At one of these such progress celebrations, Mayor Maier stated, “[t]he 
problems of the central city are solved by the people in the neighborhoods whose pride and 
fighting spirit overcome these problems” and cited the WAICO area as one of these 
neighborhoods.237 This statement marks a contrary declaration to Mayor Maier’s approach to 
neighborhood revitalization efforts from the time he took office in 1960. This flip in opinion 
could be attributed to the shift in urban renewal jargon from renewal to revitalization or could, 
perhaps, be due to mounting pressure from Milwaukee residents to decrease the amount of 
spending and demolition that accompanied urban renewal projects. While Mayor Maier’s support 
was crucial to the longevity of the organization, it was through the support of less visible, but 
still vital, outsiders that WAICO continued to thrive and grow. 
External individuals and organizations actively sought out opportunities to participate in 
area efforts as they recognized the impacts that WAICO projects were having on the 
neighborhood’s physical space. Robert G. Irwin, head of the private consultation firm 
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Redevelopment Services, Inc., worked with WAICO on a pro-bono basis to aid in the creation of 
programming for stimulating property improvements; Architects Willis and Lillian Leenhouts 
advised the group and worked with other organizations and City of Milwaukee officials to 
determine the physical needs of multiple blocks in the area.238 Robert Sutton of Sherwin-
Williams Paint Co., James L. Walsh of Walsh Sheet Metal, Inc., the Eleventh Street 4-H Club, 
Steinman Lumber Co., and Miller Lumber Co. donated their time and resources to continue to 
complete block inspections, create signage for the organization, and contributed paint and timber 
for improvement projects.239 University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Professor, Warner J. 
Bloomberg, Jr., whose encouragement helped community leaders form the organization, hailed 
WAICO as “a pioneer… in problem areas which plague our urban civilization” and continued to 
be actively involved in the organization as a consultant and a member.240 With the help of key 
community players such as this, WAICO received the boost that it needed to launch itself into 
full-scale revitalization projects.  
 
Carrying on the Roots of Bronzeville’s Community Support 
 The establishment of a community led organization followed in the evolutionary path of 
the community engagement of Bronzeville residents. The social clubs, churches, businesses, and 
familial ties that existed in Bronzeville before the construction of the expressway laid the 
foundation for larger organizations to exist. In addition, the relationships that existed within the 
larger Bronzeville community did not disappear as the structures that were consumed by urban 
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renewal projects did. This groundwork made it possible for the establishment and rapid growth 
of WAICO and was the basis for the types of strategies WAICO used to engage community 
members. WAICO’s continued commitment to area residents made it easier for the larger 
community to buy into the mission and vision of the organization. Furthermore, as area residents 
had already witnessed the potential devastation that urban renewal projects could carry out, they 
were eager to put a stop to further demolition and destruction. It was through these precursors 
that WAICO began the task of preserving their neighborhood through the engagement of 
residents. 
 By basing the organization’s mission on continued community unity, WAICO was able 
to engage community members in ways that were meaningful and substantial.  Children were not 
only encouraged to participate in educational programming and social activities, but they were 
also active in spreading the word about neighborhood projects. Older residents with specific 
skills became teachers for other adults as well as adolescents. Physical improvements to 
structures and the cleanup of vacant lots and sidewalks were clearly visible to the naked eye. 
This visibility, paired with the engagement of community members, made area residents eager to 
do more. It also encouraged other community organizations, businesses, and political leaders to 
become more active in area efforts. These strategies were used as a way to fight the demolition 
of local structures, both residential and business related, to aid in the preservation of a sense of 
place and clearly demonstrate the active role that Black community members took in the 
protection of their neighborhood. As a direct result of this grassroots, community led activism, it 
was only three years after the organization’s establishment that WAICO was approached to take 
on larger projects within the area continuing to combat the negative effects of urban renewal 
projects on the Black community.  
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Organizational Growth into the Housing Market 
 Although WAICO continued to focus on the rehabilitation of area structures, 
organizations that supported WAICO pushed for them to become involved in other aspects of 
revitalization efforts. In early 1968, Robert G. Irwin from Redevelopment Services, Inc., 
suggested to President Walker that WAICO involve themselves in the development of fifty to 
sixty new homes in the area with mortgages not to exceed $100 per month. Irwin felt that this 
new phase of WAICO could be possible due to federal and state legislation changes and the 
establishment of Midtown State Bank, a local financial institution run by Black professionals. At 
the same time, WAICO would not be responsible for fee payments in relation to development 
projects because of public agency appropriations or the advancement of funds from lenders. 
Irwin urged the Board of Directors to seriously consider this as a next phase in WAICO’s 
organizational development.241  
By January 15, 1968, WAICO’s Board unanimously voted to launch this new aspect of 
their organization in the hopes that these new homes would be sold to present homeowners in 
older homes. These older homes could then be used for public housing or for families displaced 
by other urban renewal projects. Initial hopes for the project also included the use of 
Milwaukee’s National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) Youth 
Council to provide security patrols and to help with the construction of the homes themselves. 
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Unemployed inner city residents would thereby also gain skills through employment as builders 
and tradesmen.242 
The Milwaukee Journal’s March 31, 1968 article reveals that in as few as three months, 
WAICO had obtained sites and financial backing for the construction of their model homes with 
projected dates of May 15 for groundbreaking and July 1 for completion. After securing these 
sites and backing, 100 letters were sent to property owners in the area who lived in the most 
substandard structures to see if they would set prices for their properties for WAICO 
acquirement and redevelopment. In the seven days following the distribution of these letters, 
twenty-one residents had responded favorably to WAICO’s proposition.243  
The location for the construction of these new homes was easy to determine. Because of 
the considerable clearance that accompanied the 1958 plans for a Park East Freeway, a large 
triangle shaped area was left barren in the heart of the WAICO area. With the help of Mayor 
Henry W. Maier and many other WAICO supporters, this area quickly became WAICO’s first 
redevelopment project area. The exact boundaries of this triangle area are displayed in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: WAICO Triangle Area Map. Source: “WAICO 
Housing Development Sound Study,” October 1, 1973, Page 18, 
Folder 23, Box 121, Record of the Henry W. Maier 
Administration 1960-1988, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
Archives. 
 
As this project would become WAICO’s largest undertaking, WAICO leaders revived an 
earlier organization, Citizens for Progress, to concentrate efforts on communication between 
residents and Milwaukee’s City Planning Department. WAICO wanted to ensure that residents’ 
desires for the area were heard and retained Citizens for Progress to push for the redevelopment 
of this area with low-income housing options that could be utilized by existing residents.244 It 
was through the undertaking of this large project that the WAICO area moved from being 
designated as a demolition district to a stabilization district.245 
Even with this new project, WAICO’s commitment to its residents was unwavering. 
Following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., a scholarship fund was formed to create 
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opportunities for low-income WAICO area children.246 Although some of these funds ended up 
being used for home repairs and repainting structures by the Jaycee’s and Marquette University’s 
Young Republicans Club, a large portion of the scholarship fund was used to pay summer camp 
fees for low-income children in the area.247 With a $2,500 grant from the Social Development 
Commission, President Walker formed and supervised two baseball leagues for young teens. 
Local volunteer teachers provided classes in art, music, pet care, and storytelling for young 
children were held at the newly renovated WAICO House.248  
Further public attention was drawn to the WAICO area during a weekend of $2 tours of 
area homes, gardens, churches, and schools. These tours brought in residents from across the city 
in hopes of drawing attention, as well as funding, to localized redevelopment projects.249  While 
smaller projects, such as the tours, were being organized and completed, WAICO residents 
continued to paint homes at the rate of 100 per year, worked with the City Health and Building 
Inspection Departments to tear down almost 100 buildings, and were instrumental in the passage 
of ordinances regarding vacant lots and abandoned vehicles.250 No matter what the project or 
how big the work load seemed to be, area residents were constantly reminded that without one 
another, these projects would not occur and bulldozers would ultimately reach their borders. 
1969 saw a change in leadership at WAICO; James Richardson, an Executive Committee 
member, was elected as President. In a letter to WAICO members, Richardson assured affiliates 
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that “membership and projects will expand in scope and imagination” and that WAICO would 
continue to be community collaboration in action.251 This collaboration was showcased in a 
groundbreaking ceremony in March of the same year for the model homes at Eighteenth Street 
and Walnut Street discussed a year earlier, as well as a renovated duplex available for sale.  
These newly constructed and renovated residences would be used to combat the housing 
shortage. As a very serious example, while rehabilitating homes in the area, one WAICO 
contractor, Bill Schwartz of Custom Design, reported that twenty-seven people were removed 
from a two-bedroom home in which all of them claimed residence.252 A study of the area showed 
that an average of 8.6 Black people lived in each household.253 This overcrowding not only 
threatened the structural safety of area homes, but also often created unsanitary living conditions. 
It was the hope of WAICO that with additional housing options available, the threats that 
accompanied overcrowding would be diminished. In addition to the safety benefits, these 
supplementary homes, along with others that were designed for the area, would produce over 
$53,000 per year in property taxes, a goal of federally funded urban renewal programs already in 
place in Milwaukee.254 While only two home were constructed and one rehabilitated, they 
proved that WAICO was able to accomplish urban redevelopment projects in half the time and 
with one tenth of the costs used in other Milwaukee urban renewal projects.255 
During the latter months of 1969 and early months of 1970, WAICO focused its attention 
on the Triangle Area, completing a marketability study with the help of the Stefaniak Group and 
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the Department of City Development; this study was supported by Mayor Henry W. Maier and 
many Milwaukee Aldermen and was used to determine what types of developments would thrive 
in that particular setting. The study revealed what WAICO and area residents hoped it would: 
that this area should primarily be used for residential development.256 In January of 1970, 
WAICO was awarded a county owned tract of surplus county land at North Eleventh Street, 
which would later be known as Phase I of WAICO’s redevelopment initiative.257 With the help 
of an anonymous backer, the WAICO Triangle redevelopment project was finally able to 
commence on several lots that previously held vacant buildings.258 In addition to this anonymous 
backer, individuals throughout Greater Milwaukee were called upon to provide aid in real estate, 
legal issues, architecture, and engineering.259 For WAICO, these projects marked “the start of 
building what WAICO hope[d would] be an ever more beautiful neighborhood with lots of new 
homes among many more improved homes in ‘self-help urban renewal.’”260  
 By 1969, WAICO’s member list grew to 204 individuals and companies, providing a 
significant amount of financial backing. These members spanned from Pewaukee to Madison, 
Wauwatosa to West Allis, and as far away as Topeka, Kansas; Scarsdale, New York; Braintree, 
Massachusetts; and La Mesa, California.261 Additional resources came from the local gas 
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company who donated an oven to the WAICO house, a local Garden Club who donated $1,000 
for tot lot construction, and a $30,000 grant from the City of Milwaukee for a playground.262 
Bohemian Hall, an older structure in the area on Twelfth Street and Reservoir Street, was 
purchased by a wealthy individual and donated to WAICO. This structure would be used as a 
Community Center for all types of activities, emphasizing youth programs and staffed by Urban 
Affairs students at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.263 After several years of working 
with WAICO, twenty people, most of whom were architects, formed Architects Concerned in 
WAICO (ACW) and pledged $950 worth of time per month to aid in the redevelopment of the 
WAICO area. ACW members wanted to create spaces comparable to those that existed in 
outlying suburbs, complete with sizable lots for large families and a place where residents felt 
secure and could continue to progress in a positive direction.264 All of these combined efforts 
became pieces of the forward evolution of the organization and the community as a whole. 
 Although WAICO had come across its fair share of roadblocks in the previous five years, 
nothing would compare to the obstacles it would face as a major player in Milwaukee’s central 
city redevelopment. By the late 1970s, Milwaukee County voted to sell thirty-nine parcels of 
land to WAICO for $20,000 to use for the development of twenty homes.265 However, upon 
further exploration by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), WAICO 
would be unable to build any new homes on these parcels of land due to the lack of housing in 
the city for those that would be displaced by the demolition of the parcels. While HUD looked at 
the entire city, it neglected to look at the housing that would be demolished in the WAICO area, 
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most of which was vacant, leaving WAICO with $20,000 and no land options for the start of 
Phase I.266  
 
WAICO as a Powerful Voice 
 The expansion into the creation of housing while keeping a firm commitment to area 
residents marks a significant leap for the Black community contained both within the WAICO 
area and City of Milwaukee as a whole. The city had never seen such a powerful advocate with 
connections to other community leaders for the creation of low-income housing and the 
promotion of Black residents’ desires in the planning process. Although the leap that WAICO 
took from repainting and revamping existing homes to becoming financially invested in the 
creation of new housing was a large one, the support that the organization gained from area 
residents, organizational members, and organizational affiliates aided them in making decisions 
that kept the direct community in mind.  
 The strategy of seeking and accepting outside support is reminiscent of a tactic used to 
start businesses in the original Bronzeville area. Just as Black business owners accepted outside 
support from white businessmen and women, WAICO was willing to integrate outside 
community organizations and individuals who showed a commitment to the preservation of the 
neighborhood and, thus, a Black sense of place. It can be assumed that WAICO leaders knew 
that to continue to have a significant impact on the Black community, they would need to be 
willing to accept outside aid in several realms including planning and finances. Because of their 
commitment to the larger community, they were willing to do so while maintaining the integrity 
of the organization’s mission. WAICO was also extremely successful in promoting the small 
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victories of the Black community and pushing the organization’s accomplishments into the 
spotlight, fostering Black voices and Black activism. 
 As in the response to the growing strength of the Bronzeville community, obstructions 
from outsiders and other entities seeking to develop land in the WAICO area threatened the 
forward progress of WAICO development projects. Companies and corporations began to take 
notice of the potential for land development for urban renewal projects in the WAICO area and 
worked diligently to secure the land for these projects. The desires and needs of area residents 
would not be incorporated into these projects, just as they had been disregarded when 
construction projects were planned for the Bronzeville area. The similarities between the 
strengths and ultimate demise of Bronzeville and the roadblocks that WAICO encountered as it, 
too, gained strength cannot be ignored. But even as these outside forces sought to satisfy their 
own interests, the organization and area residents remained steadfast and committed to their 
neighborhood and one another.  
 
Milwaukee: A Model City? 
Shifts in the strategies that the federal government employed meant that WAICO 
received a boost from a federal program put into place in 1966 by President Lyndon Johnson 
called Model Cities. Much like previous urban renewal legislation, Model Cities was “designed 
to remove or arrest blight and decay in entire sections and neighborhoods, and to improve the 
quality of life of the people who live in these sections and neighborhoods through a 
concentration of Federal and local programs.”267 This program required that a city receiving a 
Model City program designation would address ten overall objectives: 
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1) To rebuild or revitalize slum and blighted areas 
2) To expand housing 
3) To expand job and income opportunities 
4) To reduce dependence on welfare payments 
5) To improve educational facilities and programs 
6) To combat disease and ill health 
7) Reduce the incidence of crime and delinquency 
8) To enhance recreational and cultural opportunities 
9) To establish better access between homes and jobs 
10) To improve living conditions for the people living in these areas268 
 
While Milwaukee Mayor Henry W. Maier twice pushed for the approval of the Common 
Council to apply to become a Model City in 1967, it was not until March of 1968 that they 
ultimately approved the act of applying for federal dollars.269 By the end of 1968, Milwaukee 
received an assurance of $40 million in Model Cities funding for urban redevelopment 
projects.270 It was not until the 1970s, however, that WAICO received any sort of financial 
assistance from the Model Cities program. In early 1970, the organization received $135,000  for 
general operating costs, a small portion of the total amount WAICO was promised for future 
projects.271 
 It was also during this time that the plans for the Park East freeway were being heavily 
scrutinized by court officials. Although WAICO had already conducted several studies of the 
Triangle area, HUD ordered additional environmental impact assessments and WAICO took 
another hit. Due to the total enclosure of the Triangle Area by proposed freeways, HUD 
determined that the site was unsuitable for residential development. These findings were not 
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represented in any studies WAICO had previously piloted. This new study was conducted in 
direct response to the desires of many local stakeholders for the construction of large structures 
and compounds for companies to bid on in hopes that big businesses would return to the City of 
Milwaukee. In response, WAICO President, James Richardson, stated that the environmental 
hazards found have been hazards that “[B]lacks have been forced to live with for decades with 
little concern about air and noise pollution… If [B]lacks will not be allowed to seek housing they 
want in neighborhoods near freeways… where do they go?”272 Henry S. Reuss, Democratic 
Wisconsin Congressman and supporter of WAICO, wrote a letter to George Romney, then 
Secretary of HUD, to look at WAICO’s case personally to determine whether or not Romney 
could overturn HUD’s decision.273 
 By June of 1972, George Romney sent HUD representatives to Milwaukee to evaluate 
the Triangle Area Phase I and assured Henry S. Reuss that their findings would be used to either 
help WAICO find other suitable land for redevelopment or would review an additional 
application for this land “showing how the environmental problems can be mitigated.”274 On July 
14, 1972, HUD reversed its decision, pending the adoption of noise abatement standards.275 With 
the promise of financial backing for noise abatement berms from Model Cities, WAICO was 
able to focus their attention, once again, on land acquisition and the relocation of area residents 
to move forward with the first phase of redevelopment: constructing 107 housing units.276 
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 The successes of WAICO thrust them into the national spotlight during a conference 
entitled “Lessons Learned Through Model Cities” held in Chicago in October of 1972. Model 
Cities Associate Director, John H. Givens, Jr., called WAICO “a success story in grass-roots 
development” and acknowledged that WAICO had been working to rebuild their community 
long before Model Cities even existed. Along with President Richardson, WAICO was 
represented at this conference by their partners in redevelopment, SPA/REDCO and Recht, 
Goldin & Siegel.277 Discussions during the Chicago conference allowed WAICO to realize that 
they were not the only Model Cities project facing barriers and were asked to visit two 
redevelopment projects in other cities to advise their staff.278 WAICO leaders returned to 
Milwaukee with a new sense of pride and more determination than ever to ensure the 
development of new housing options for WAICO residents. 
 By the end of 1972, Model Cities had given WAICO $546,000 for the development of 
WAICO’s Triangle Area, which they used to buy land, tear down properties, relocate individuals 
and families, and pay a small WAICO staff of six people.279 Out of the fifty-two properties 
WAICO needed to acquire for total razing for Phase I, only three remained out of WAICO’s 
financial control. These three properties were owned by individuals who had acquired the 
properties from deceased relatives and by individuals who had no interest in retaining the 
property. Thus, by late 1973, WAICO acquired these estates.280 Finally, after years of work, on 
September 25, 1973, it was determined that WAICO’s Phase I project satisfied all of HUD’s 
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requirements and was awarded $1.8 million in federal funding for the construction of their low-
income housing project.281  
 On October 6, 1973, Mayor Henry W. Maier helped WAICO break ground for Phase I of 
the WAICO Triangle and praised WAICO residents stating, “…this project is a reminder of what 
people can do in their own neighborhood if they work together under dedicated neighborhood 
leadership.”282 Maier’s speech focused on the collaboration of citizens and government to create 
change and testified that these 107 units of housing would represent this collaboration long after 
Model Cities programming ended, which ultimately occurred under the leadership of President 
Richard Nixon.283  
 The destruction of the Model Cities program, along with the passage of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1974, which eliminated federal funding for urban renewal 
projects as well as National Housing Partnership Grants, meant that WAICO lost a significant 
amount of financial backing.284 This withdrawal of funds significantly threatened the completion 
of WAICO Phase I. It also meant that WAICO had to drastically cut back on spending, including 
paid staff members, travel compensation, consultants, and office overhead.285 
 WAICO received another devastating blow when prices in the housing industry became 
so inflated that their longtime partners, Recht, Goldin & Seigel, withdrew their support due to 
rising construction costs that made construction within HUD regulated mortgage limits 
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impossible.286 The inflation that was present in the housing market invaded other markets as well 
as investors and government entities sought to globalize markets and create additional liquidity 
to attempt to create additional stability and financing.287 Although their partners withdrew 
support, WAICO leaders and residents persisted. A new developer, Matt Starck and Sons, was 
approached and asked to reevaluate WAICO’s Phase I for contracting. Although Starck and Sons 
set their fee at just under $2 million, much lower than Recht, Goldin & Seigel, HUD promised 
only $1.8 million in financial backing for the project. WAICO leaders dug in their heels and 
were awarded just under $190,000 from the County to make up for the discrepancy. WAICO 
benefactor, Mrs. Whyte, donated over $40,000 to help the organization gain letters of credit for 
continued construction.288  
 With construction finally beginning on WAICO’s first full-scale housing project, the 
organization began to look ahead at what would happen once people moved in. With the help of 
a $35,000 grant from the City of Milwaukee, three WAICO staff members were retained and 
focused on two objectives: creating a sense of community for new residents and facilitating the 
construction of Phases II (36 units) and III (56 units) with the help of community volunteers.289 
By September of 1975, Phase I and its 107 housing units were completed with a 100 percent 
occupancy rate. New applications were coming in faster than the housing became available. 
Because of this, James Richardson reached out to political figures, such as Mayor Henry W. 
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Maier and 7th District Supervisor Terrance L. Pitts, in support of WAICO to push for the 
approval of funds for the construction of Phase II.290 The desire for public housing options, such 
as Phase I of the WAICO project, was seen in other cities throughout the United States. As 
Arnold R. Hirsch uncovers, Chicago’s Ida B. Wells public housing project opened with 1,662 
units available and 17,544 applications received to fill these units.291  
 Although it took another two years, by early 1978, Phases II and III were approved for 
funding by HUD and in collaboration with the National Housing Partnership (NHP).292 Phase 
II’s groundbreaking was scheduled for July 22, 1978, symbolizing the power of community.293 
Although much information is missing from the time of the groundbreaking to the actual grand 
opening festivities in June of 1981, it can be assumed that issues similar to those surrounding the 
construction of Phase I were encountered, stalling construction and completion for almost three 
years. This particular grand opening celebration brought WAICO supporters, including 
Congressman Henry S. Reuss, Alderman Kevin O’Connor, and the North Division High School 
Band, together once again to celebrate the accomplishments of this small community in 
Milwaukee. 294  
 While WAICO accomplished these victories with over 140 units of properties 
constructed for low-income individuals and families, Phase III would not be so lucky. In late 
1981, WAICO was denied funding for the construction of an additional twenty units to be 
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designated as low-income housing properties in the WAICO Triangle Area.295 In order to be 
approved, James Richardson and WAICO leaders looked to have Phase III designated as a 
facility for the handicapped and elderly. WAICO gained HUD approval and broke ground for a 
40-unit housing development, known as Richardson Manor, which was completed in October of 
1987.296  
 Although WAICO’s goal was to complete 500 units of housing in the Triangle Area, by 
1987 183 units of housing were built.297 This amount of housing units is evidence of the 
significance of collaboration on multiple levels, including citizens, neighborhoods, city leaders, 
and national leaders, to create positive community change. It is also indicative of the hardships 
and difficulties that the WAICO group faced when trying to create housing to accommodate their 
growing numbers and the members of the larger Black population that had been displaced. 
Though there was a continued need for low-income housing options, larger entities that had 
significant influence in the housing market were often successful in stifling those needs. 
However, WAICO area citizens did not abandon the needs of the Black community and, instead, 
worked together to improve their immediate environment and create better housing options for 
themselves, a huge accomplishment for the Black community as a whole.  
 For the duration that WAICO existed, the organization employed a varied of strategies to 
encourage the integration of Black voices into the decisions that directly affected not only their 
neighborhoods, but their sense of self, sense of place, and sense of community identity. While 
these strategies varied, they had one end goal: the positive promotion and forward progression of 
the Black community. By highlighting the accomplishments of WAICO and integrating their 
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narrative into descriptions of the Black urban experience, the predominant view of Black 
residents as idle and inactive in terms of community transformation can be challenged and 
perceptions can begin to change. 
 
Conclusion 
 Though a large split was constructed through the Bronzeville community during the 
period of urban renewal, many of the positive and progressive characteristics that were present in 
the neighborhood persisted in the smaller areas that survived beyond urban renewal projects. In 
order to assure that these areas would remain for area residents, primarily lower income Black 
people, inhabitants needed to work together to preserve and create better housing options for 
themselves in the area in which they were most comfortable. The creation of the Walnut Area 
Improvement Council, Inc. was a step in the direction of stability for those residents displaced by 
urban renewal projects, for the residents that lived within WAICO’s boundaries, and, ultimately, 
the Black community as a whole.  
 Just as churches, social clubs, families, and businesses were social institutions in 
Bronzeville, WAICO can be seen as a social institution in one of the fragmented pieces of 
Bronzeville. WAICO employed strategies to influence the way that area residents carried and 
valued themselves. Initially, WAICO utilized tactics that sought to improve the physical nature 
of the WAICO area. Trash cleanups, abandoned car removal, and exterior remodeling and 
repainting were central to the organization’s efforts. While these activities were important, they 
did not overshadow larger strategies aimed at creating a self-reliant community: positive 
engagement of youth and teens, job skills training, educational programming, and life skills 
training. Ultimately, WAICO sought to promote the intrinsic value of the Black community 
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through stimulating the inclusion of the Black voice in many different arenas. The formation of a 
WAICO newsletter, the continued coverage of WAICO actions by local news sources, and the 
engagement of public figures with a fair amount of power bolstered their reputation and their 
efforts and cast a bright light on the positive attributes of the Black community. The commitment 
of the organization to area residents could not be denied and with each strategy WAICO 
employed, community members increasingly rallied around them. Buy in from community 
members was crucial during this time period because of the distrust that urban renewal projects 
had created. 
The root shock that many Black community members felt lingered for years after the 
initial destruction of their homes and businesses and the displacement they suffered. Even those 
who were not directly ripped from their homes felt the effects of urban renewal efforts. Because 
of the close proximity to the construction of I-43, it is safe to assume that many WAICO area 
residents took on boarders or family members who had been directly affected by demolition 
projects. Residents of WAICO were also unable to reach what remained of Bronzeville on the 
opposite side of the expressway. Enduring businesses and residents were virtually cut off from 
one another, creating a physical and emotional rift and a destruction of a Black sense of place. 
Thus, creating a sense of continuity, cohesion, and support within the fractured pieces of 
Bronzeville was important. Residents and neighbors needed to be reassured that further 
displacement and the effects of root shock would not continue to disrupt their livelihoods. 
WAICO worked diligently to provide a foundation of support and continuity, with particular 
emphasis on a sense of place manifested in the housing sector. 
The progression of the organization from one that restored homes and the area’s physical 
space to one involved in the creation of housing did come rapidly, but proved to be a task that the 
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Black community, as a whole, was ready for. By creating new homes for local residents to 
inhabit, the preservation of a Black sense of place could be realized. These homes would also 
allow for additional displaced Black community members from Bronzeville to remain in an area 
where they could feel the sense of community that was present in the larger area. Though this 
new undertaking took the support of many outside individuals, WAICO was able to maintain 
ultimate control over project directions. This control was crucial in order to guarantee that the 
integrity of WAICO’s mission was being upheld and that the needs of the immediate community 
were being met. With direct involvement in the process of housing creation for a targeted portion 
of Milwaukee’s Black population, WAICO was able to negate a stereotype that accompanied 
being designated as a Black individual.  
The involvement of community members outside of the direct WAICO area, especially 
those individuals that held a fair amount of power, such as Mayor Henry W. Maier, various 
Aldermen, and Congressman Henry S. Reuss, also marked a shift in the way that Black people 
were perceived in certain sections of society. WAICO served as a representative of the Black 
community in local media outlets, most heavily in the Milwaukee Journal and the Milwaukee 
Sentinel, but also garnered the attention of federal entities as a Model City project area. While 
this change was significant for some, for others, stereotypical and negative perceptions of the 
Black community continued to endure. The continued growth of WAICO’s member base 
indicated that the reach of the organization’s efforts and triumphs were being recognized on a 
national scale. The WAICO area and its residents became a symbol of Black progression for 
many as it continued to overcome obstacles to create low-income housing for Black residents in 
Milwaukee.  
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The completion of Phase I showcased the desire of Black community members to remain 
in areas familiar to them. While low-income housing constructed through urban renewal projects 
by outside development firms was created, it was not created in a space familiar to those that 
were meant to occupy them. Phase I low-income housing options were 100 percent filled to 
capacity with a waiting list to keep apartments occupied for years to come. This can directly be 
attributed to the sense of community and belonging that accompanied the Bronzeville 
neighborhood before it was torn in half and the sense of solidarity that WAICO helped to create. 
Although Phases II and III did not come as quickly as WAICO had desired and as promptly as 
they was needed, portions of the initial plans did come to fruition, marking the tenacity of the 
organization and area residents.  
Changes in the various economic markets accompanied shifts in the focus of 
governmental entities. Instead of being focused on localized urban renewal efforts, the federal 
government and, thus, local markets, shifted towards a more globalized economy. This meant 
less emphasis on localized efforts that could potentially cost more and more emphasis on 
cheaper, far-reaching approaches, including packaged-mortgages and tax exemptions for mass-
produced goods and services. With this shift away from community development, WAICO found 
it more and more difficult to retain long-term partnerships as well as financial backing for 
projects that would directly benefit the immediate community. It was only through the 
manipulation of the vision of Phase III of the Triangle Project from low-income housing to 
housing for the elderly and disabled that it was constructed. After Phase III’s completion, the 
organization found it too difficult to exist as it once had.  
Because of the shifts in governmental priorities, Milwaukee’s Black community lost a 
portion of its foundation as the efforts of WAICO became less prominent and decreasingly 
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viable. Once again, the Black community’s needs were pushed aside to make way for what 
society deemed to be the next step in its evolution. While this larger shift caused WAICO to 
cease to be a formal nonprofit organization, the exploration of its successes and development are 
a crucial part of Black Milwaukee’s history. The existence of WAICO also demonstrates the 
retention of the sense of community that was present in Bronzeville before the physical rift of the 
expressway was constructed. The development of a grassroots, community led organization that 
represented the interests of Black people and promoted Black solidarity and support in the face 
of federally sustained destruction of the Black community was a huge asset that deserves 
promotion and further exploration.  
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Chapter Four 
Conclusions and Implications for Current and Future Research 
 
The exploration of the Black urban experience surrounding and in response to federal and 
local urban renewal legislation and efforts is crucial to understanding, interpreting, and adding to 
current scholarship on Black history in Milwaukee. By advocating for a more complete 
understanding, interpretation, and addition of missing histories, pieces of important Black history 
can be inserted back into the history of the United States. The examination of Black experiences 
is important due to the fact that a significant portion of Black history has been left out of current 
scholarship, either deliberately or unintentionally. This erasure of Black history is detrimental to 
the Black community as a whole as it continues to portray Black people as largely inactive apart 
from actions surrounding iconic histories, such as the Underground Railroad and the Civil Rights 
movement. This stereotypical perceptions of Black people as inactive continues to plague the 
community today. However, by piecing together a rebuttal to this stereotype, the perception of 
the Black community as a whole can change. Omitting pieces of Black history is also harmful to 
current and future generations who will end up losing any connection to this history if they are 
not recorded before evidence of them is destroyed.  
By exploring the existing scholarship of Gilbert Osofsky, James R. Grossman, Arnold R. 
Hirsch, Thomas J. Sugrue, and David M. P. Freund surrounding New York City’s Harlem, 
Chicago, and Detroit, one gains the perspective that the pressures put on Black communities to 
settle in certain sections of the city were analogous in cities across the United States. Black 
residents were forced into sections of the city abandoned through white flight, the use of 
destructive language, and the manipulation of societal perceptions. Organized groups of realtors, 
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lawmakers, and Neighborhood Improvement Associations deliberately took action to bar Black 
residents from sections of the city and used the vitality of the housing market to influence city 
resident’s views. By utilizing these tactics, residential segregation persisted and became a 
“natural” part of market fluctuations and immediate environments. 
As deindustrialization and white flight continued to affect cities across the United States, 
the federal government took action in the form of urban renewal legislation. Projects deemed as 
urban renewal targeted specific sections of the city that contained blight and substandard 
housing. Not surprisingly, these areas were the same areas in which Black communities existed. 
Thus, urban renewal projects can be seen as a form of urbicide, or the specific targeting of 
sections of the city for annihilation. By eradicating the blight that existed within cities, Black 
people and neighborhoods that had been forcefully created would be destroyed and Black 
residents would be forced to disperse. This demolition destroyed thriving Black communities in 
an intentional and targeted way. In addition to the physical destruction of Black communities, an 
internal sense of place was simultaneously devastated. Just as Black communities were working 
to create cohesive neighborhoods and unity within their forced borders complete with Black-
owned businesses and the ability to own homes, their sense of place was destroyed with the 
passing of urban renewal legislation and subsequent projects. A larger conversation about the 
negative effects of urban renewal projects did not appear until thousands of structures had been 
demolished and thousands more residents were displaced. 
Accompanying the conversation of the destruction of a Black sense of place is the 
concept of root shock or the emotional effects that are tied to the physical destruction of the 
Black community. This physical destruction creates an environment of distrust, anxiety, 
destabilization, and an increase in stress. Thus, not only did urban renewal destroy the physical 
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space of Black residents, but it also produced an environment of emotional upheaval for 
generations to come. All of the scholars referenced in this research project represent a portion of 
what comprises the entirety of the Black urban experience. Combined, they lay the foundation 
for future scholars to explore the Black urban experience utilizing some of the same tactics 
present in their research. It is through the use of these approaches that the history of the Walnut 
Street area from its creation through the major years of urban renewal initiatives was explored. 
In spite of the structural institutions and forces that shaped the Black urban landscape of 
Milwaukee, Black community members learned to lean on one another to create a safety net of 
support, helped one another start and maintain businesses, aided one another in the procurement 
of resources, both financial and material, and created thriving communities of unity and 
encouragement through hard work and perseverance. Milwaukee’s Bronzeville was a prime 
example of how hard work and perseverance could create community cohesion. Local residents 
and all-Black social clubs supported Black entrepreneurs so that they could sustain themselves in 
a white-dominated business sector and to keep financial resources within the forced borders of 
Bronzeville. In this same vein, area businesses employed local residents and teens to keep 
employment options in close proximity to living situations and to keep youth out of trouble. 
These same social clubs assisted area residents in times of financial distress and emotional 
upheaval. Youth and teen activities were planned with the hopes of providing life skills, athletic 
opportunities, and a safe place for socialization. Neighbors knew neighbors and worked together 
to create a stable and productive environment for Bronzeville’s Black community. As the 
strengths and power of the Black community continued to grow, the federal government passed 
legislation widely known as urban renewal. 
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 Under the leadership of Milwaukee Mayors Frank P. Zeidler and Henry W. Maier, local 
urban renewal projects consumed a large portion of Bronzeville. The characteristics present in 
Bronzeville - solidarity, support, unity, and community pride, along with the growing political 
power of Black residents - can be seen as threats to continued white domination in the city. Thus, 
local lawmakers and those in power sought out Bronzeville for urban renewal projects and 
willfully destroyed the Black community that existed there. The larger population saw 
Milwaukee’s urban renewal projects as positive additions to the city’s vitality and economic 
base. As a result, little to no regard was given to the lives and livelihoods that were destroyed by 
them. Even after the Black community began to “make some noise” in regards to the housing 
options they were given, decision makers and developers had their own agendas in mind. 
Displaced residents were given few options to relocate, particularly the option to relocate to a 
dwelling in close proximity to what was left of Bronzeville. What resulted was the continued 
overcrowding of an already limited housing stock and sustained negative perceptions and 
stereotypes of the Black community were also perpetuated due to the continuous use of specific 
jargon and the targeting of certain areas of the city. However, in response to continued urban 
renewal projects threatening the displacement of additional Black bodies and the destruction of 
housing options, a small part of what was once Bronzeville organized their resources to combat 
the people and machines that threatened their homes and their sense of place. 
The creation of the Walnut Area Improvement Council, Inc. (WAICO), a grassroots, 
community-led organization, marked a significant progression for Milwaukee’s Black 
community as the organization became a powerful voice for the people and kept the desires and 
needs of local Black residents in mind. WAICO was formed by a group of local individuals 
seeking to preserve the integrity of their community and the structures that existed there. 
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Utilizing local residents, WAICO was able to significantly impact the physical environment of 
their neighborhood through area trash cleanups, targeting specific properties for repainting and 
general repairs, conducting area walk-throughs to locate abandoned vehicles, and sodding vacant 
lots. At the same time, WAICO worked to continue to represent characteristics contained within 
Bronzeville by engaging area youth in ways that would promote life skills, stability, and a sense 
of kinship. These initial undertakings brought attention to the area and thrust the organization 
and their efforts into the spotlight.  
Before long, WAICO began the task of creating housing options within their borders. 
With the help of external advocates, several of whom had a fair amount of power, WAICO was 
able to develop plans for three low-income housing projects for those displaced by previous, 
current, and future urban renewal projects. While these plans were developed, continued 
obstacles, changing legislative priorities, and competition from other development firms caused 
these projects to stall and to be manipulated to fit the conditions of changing regulations. Even 
though the initial goal of constructing three housing developments for low-income Black 
residents did not come to fruition exactly as expected, the triumphs of WAICO cannot be denied. 
They became one example of the tenacity of Black-led organizations and accomplished much of 
their success utilizing funds and donations generated within the immediate community and 
through their supporters nationwide. WAICO, as an organization, was able to develop and evolve 
rapidly while keeping the goal of creating a self-reliant community in the forefront. The 
organization’s commitment to area residents and advocacy for the Black community cannot be 
denied and should be included in narratives of the Black urban experience. 
Not only does WAICO represent a negation of popular views of Black residents during 
the urban renewal period, it also provides a piece of Milwaukee’s Black history that has largely 
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been left out of existing historical pieces. The exploration of WAICO as a crucial element of 
Milwaukee’s Black history is imperative. Milwaukee residents who were a part of Bronzeville 
and the WAICO area are rapidly aging. Their experiences and histories must be documented so 
that researchers and scholars do not lose their understandings and interpretations of urban events 
completely. By adding Black histories and giving space to document Black voices within 
discussion of the Black urban experience, the dominant view of history from that of influential 
white people, can be affected to reflect a more inclusive history instead of the fragments that 
currently exist as those who write history often do not represent the whole. 
In addition, the continued exploration of the Black urban experience representing the 
Black community aids in exposing structural racism and institutionalized disadvantage that 
Black residents faced in the past and continue to face today. This includes a discussion about 
how those in power use certain jargon and expressions to influence the perceptions of the general 
public. Most importantly, however, the exploration of the Black urban experience with these 
characteristics in mind serves as a point where the discussion of Black communities can begin to 
transform into a discussion including the narratives from the perspective of Black residents. 
Although other researchers have explored grassroots and community activism within the 
City of Milwaukee, this thesis marks one of the first attempts to include a discussion of WAICO 
and the actions the organization took to influence the Black urban landscape within the city into 
that scholarship. The narrative of WAICO is both important and poignant. While they were able 
to evolve quickly and with little opposition, the moment WAICO became an active force in the 
housing market, their forward progress slowed and opposition from developers outside of the 
immediate environment began to push back on their progression. It can be assumed, that forward 
Black progression in other markets was met with comparable resistance and similar challenges.  
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It is the hope of this researcher that through this discussion of WAICO, other aspects of 
Milwaukee’s Black community in sectors apart from the housing market will be explored. 
Through this, a more complete history of Milwaukee’s Black community can be uncovered and 
the view of Black residents as idle and dismissive will be rejected. It is the job of researchers and 
scholars to uncover complete truths and this tiny piece of the Black urban experience is an 
attempt to do just that. 
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